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THE COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT OF 1954
"What does this bill really entail? Nobody really knows."
-Rep. Emanuel Celler *
THE Communist Control Act of 1954 1 marks the most direct statutory
attack on internal communism yet undertaken by Congress. Hitherto, legisla-
tion employed to curb communist activities has been of a general nature;
categories of proscribed groups or individuals have been established,2 and these
classes have been interpreted to encompass the Communist Party and its mem-
bers.3 Although a number of the CCA's provisions simply constitute amend-
ments to these earlier "anti-subversive" acts, 4 many of its important sections
are directed specifically against the Party and its members.5
This new approach in a controversial area has produced a complicated law
with an unusual legislative background. Much of it was proposed on the floor
of Congress, without hearings and with little opportunity for careful analysis
of the statutory language. 6 The haste and confusion attending the Act's pas-
sage 7 have resulted in many vague and ambiguous provisions. An examina-
*This statement was made by Rep. Celler during the debates on the Communist Control
Act. 100 Cong. Rec. 13836 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954).
1. Communist Control Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (August 24,
1954) (hereinafter cited as CCA).
2. See, e.g., Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 987, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1952)(hereinafter cited as ISA) (proscribed groups) ; Alien Registration Act, 54 STAr. 670
(1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952) (Smith Act) (proscribed individuals).
3. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11850,
D.C. Cir., Dec. 23, 1954 (affirming the order of the SACB applying the ISA to the Com-
munist Party) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950) (applying the Smith Act to
Communist Party leaders) ; United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954) (same);
United States v. Lightfoot, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1955, p. 1, col. 2 (applying the Smith Act
to Communist Party members).
4. CCA §§ 6-11.
5. CCA §§ 2, 3 (party); CCA §§ 4, 5 (members).
6. All of the CCA §§ 2-6 and the proviso in § 7(a) of the CCA became part of the
Act on the floor of Congress or in the conference committee. 100 Cong. Rec. 13549 (daily
ed. Aug. 12, 1954) (proviso in § 7(a)); id. at 13557 (§§ 2 and 6); id. at 13985 (daily
ed. Aug. 16, 1954) (§ 3 as contained in the House bill presented to the Senate) ; id. at
14090 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954) (§ 5) ; id. at 14332, 14390-91 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954)
(amendments recommended by conference committee, including § 4 presented to the
House and Senate).
There were extensive hearings by the Senate on most of §§ 7-11 of the CCA. See 100
Cong. Rec. 13410 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1954) ; S. REP. No. 1709, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1954).
For a transcript of some of the hearings, see, e.g., Hearings before Subconnnittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary on S. 23, S. 1254, and S. 1606, 83d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.
(1954). However, the House apparently held no hearings even on these provisions. See
H.R. REP'. No. 2651, pt. 2, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954) (minority report).
7. See remarks by Rep. Celler, 100 Cong. Rec. 13836 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954);
Sen. Cooper, id. at 13953; Sen. Lehman, id. at 13900; and Sen. Kefauver, id. at 14395
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954).
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tion of the legislative history of the Act will be helpful to a later analysis of
its specific provisions.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The CCA is the outgrowth of two separate bills dealing with distinct but
related subjects. Senator Butler introduced the first of these bills as an
amendment to the Internal Security Act of 1950.8 That Act created and de-
fined two types of "communist organizations." Senator Butler's bill w;as
designed to add a third class, the "Communist-infiltrated organization,"",
meant to apply particularly to labor unions and thereby to facilitate removal
of communists from positions of union leadership." Senator Humphrey, on
the floor of the Senate, offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute.1-
This amendment was directed at the Communist Party and its members, the
"root of the evil."'13 The major provision in Senator Humphrey's bill made
it a crime to be a Party member and provided for penalties of up to five years
imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.14 By an amendment proposed by Senator
Daniel, 15 the Butler and Humphrey bills were combined into a single bill,'(
which the Senate unanimously approved.' 7
8. S. 3706 was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 6, 1954. 100
Cong. Rec. 9217 (daily ed. July 6, 1954). The Butler bill consisted of what eventually
became §§ 7-11 of the CCA.
9. The two categories of "communist organizations" defined by the ISA are the
"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations. 64 STAT. 989 (1954), 50 U.S.C.
§ 782 (1952). See note 247 infra for definitions of these organizations.
10. See statements of Sen. Butler, sponsor of the bill. 100 Cong. Rec. 13411 (daily
ed. Aug. 11, 1954). Also see S. REP. No. 1709, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954); H.R. REP.
No. 2651, pt. 1, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954).
11. See note 269 infra.
12. For the text of the original Humphrey bill, see 100 Cong. Rec. 13557 (daily ed.
Aug. 12, 1954).
13. Ibid.
14. Section 3 of the Humphrey bill provided that knowing and willing members of
"(1) the Communist Party, or (2) any other organization having for one of its purpose!,
... the establishment, control, conduct, seizure, or overthrow of the Government of the
United States . .. b the use of force or violence, with knowledge of the purpose or
objective of such organization, shall upon conviction be punished as provided by the
penalty provisions of section 15 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 19Z0." 100
Cong. Rec. 13557 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954). Section 15 of that Act provides a maximum
penalty of a $10,000 fine and five years imprisonment. 64 ST.r. 1003 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§ 794(c) (1952).
Several states have statutes making membership in the Communist Party a crime. See
IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-5204 (Btrns Supp. 1951); MAss. A.xx. LAws c. 264, § 19 (Supp.
1954) ; Th-x. REv. Civ. STAT. A-x. art. 6889-3A, § 5 (Supp. 1954). The constitutiunality of
these laws have not been passed upon by either state or federal courts.
In addition to the section making membership in the Party a crime, Senator Hum-
phrey's bill included findings of fact (now § 2 of the CCA) and a provision amending the
ISA to make it unlawful for members of a "Communist-action" or Communist-front"
organizations to be officers of unions (now § 6 of the CCA).
15. 100 Cong. Rec. 13561 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954).
16. Id. at 13578.
17. Id. at 13583.
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The House version,1 8 passed a few days later, 10 also combined the two
original Senate bills. But instead of the section making party membership a
crime, the House substituted a section which deprived the Communist Party
of "whatever rights, privileges, and immunities . . . have heretofore been
granted to said party." 20 When the Senate was confronted with the House
version, it added to it both the original provision making membership in the
Party a crime and a section which listed criteria for determining what consti-
tutes membership in the Communist Party and related organizations.-'
In conference, a major change was made in the bill. The section making
party membership criminal was altered so as merely to subject Party members
to the "provisions and penalties of the Internal Security Act of 1950" as mem-
bers of a "Communist-action" organization. 22 This amendment was due largely
to extensive criticism of the original provision, the major objection being that
it would seriously impair the effectiveness of the registration provisions of
the ISA. 23 The bill as thus amended was approved by a unanimous Senate - 4
and by all but two members of the House of Representatives, 25 and was signed
by the President.26
18. Id. at 13832-34 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954).
19. Id. at 13849-50.
20. See § 3 of the House bill, id. at 13833. This section now constitutes § 3 of the
CCA.
21. These amendments were proposed by Senator Humphrey, 100 Cong. Rec. 14090
(daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954), and were accepted by the Senate, id. at 14093-94. The section
establishing criteria for membership was finally adopted virtually intact as § 5 of the
CCA.
22. See the report of the conference committee, 100 Cong. Rec. 14332, 14390-91
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954). The provision as thus amended became § 4 of the CCA.
23. Some congressmen had doubts concerning the constitutionality of the provision as
originally proposed by Senator Humphrey. See remarks by Rep. Celler, 100 Cong. Rec.
13836 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954), and Sens. McCarran, Butler, and Cooper, id. at 13943,
13560-61, 13566 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954). It was also felt that the section added nothing
to existing statutes since the Smith Act already made a crime of membership in an organi-
zation advocating the violent overthrow of the government. See remarks of Sens. Cooper,
id. at 13566, and McCarran, id. at 13944 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954).
However, the major point of criticism was that it would interfere with and perhaps
void the registration provisions of the ISA, on the theory that if membership in the Party
were made a crime, members could base a refusal to register under the ISA upon an invoca-
tion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See remarks of Rep.
Reed, id. at 13836 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954) and Sens. McCarran, id. at 13945, andKe-
fauver, id. at 14079 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954). See also the statement by Sen. Humphrey,
id. at 14394 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954).
24. Id. at 14410.
25. Id. at 14332. Reps. Burdick and Multer cast the two dissenting votes,
26. There is some question whether the President signed the same bill that was
passed by Congress, or whether it was changed somewhat after he signed it. See Com-
plaint, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Makers v. Brownell, reproduced in BNA
WASHINGTON DAILY REPORTER SYsTz,:, DAILY LABOR REPORT (No. 194, Oct. 6, 1954),
in which the union is seeking a declaratory judgment that the CCA is "not a statute, act
or law of the United States and is, therefore, null and void and has no legal force or
effect."
[Vol. 64:- 712
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THE CONGRESIONAL FINDINGS
Section 2 of the CCA consists of congressional findings concerning the nature
of the Communist Party and the danger the Party poses to the security of the
United States. In these findings, Congress declares that the Communist Party,
"although purportedly a political party, is in fact an instrumentality of a con-
spiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States." The findings
then list the differences between the Communist Party and the other political
parties in the United States :27 the policies of the Communist Party are dictated
by foreign leaders; the members are subject to slavish discipline imposed
by party chieftains; and the Party recognizes no constitutional or statutory
limitations upon either its conduct or that of its members. Congress also finds
that, though the Party is numerically small, its dedication to the violent over-
throw of the United States Government and its role as the agent of a hostile
foreign power make its existence a "clear, present and continuing danger
to the security of the United States."- s Therefore, Congress concludes, "the
Communist Party should be outlawed."2 9
Similar legislative findings have been incorporated into related statutes
such as the ISA 30 and New York's Feinberg law.3' These findings may become
very important when questions of a statute's constitutionality are raised. For
example, the existence of circumstances showing both a need for the legislation
and the reasonableness of the remedy adopted by the legislature becomes crucial
when the statute is attacked as violating due process or First Amendment
rights.32 If the legislative findings are the product of extensive investigation, as
27. Section 2 avoids the use of the phrase "other political parties." This wording as
originally used, but was changed in order to emphasize Congress' belief that the Part,
was a conspiracy rather than a political party. See 100 Cong. Rc. 13937, 13939 (daily
ed. Aug. 16, 1954), 14080 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954).
28. The CCA, however, does not make the existence of the Party unlauful. See
remarks of Sens. Kefauver and Butler, 100 Cong. Rec. 14079, 14031 (daily ed. Aug. 17,
1954).
Compare the laws of several states which make the existence of the Communist
Party illegal: MAss. Axzx. LAws c. 264 §§ 16A, 17 (Supp. 1954); TEx. Rz-. Cim. STAT.
ANN. art. 6899-3A, § 2 (Supp. 1954). The Texas statute, like the CCA, denies the Party
"any rights, privileges, or immunities attendant upon bodies under the jurisdiction of the
State of Texas ... ," but it also orders that the funds, records, and other property belong-
ing to the Party be seized and forfeited to the state.
Other state laws declare the existence of organizations advocating the violent over-
throw of the Government of the United States or of the state illegal, and provide for
the seizure and forfeiture of the organizations' funds, books, and records. See, e.g.,
LA. REv. STAT. § 14.370 (Supp. 1954).
29. Aside from the title of the act, this is the only part of the CCA in which the
term "outlawed" is used. This statement of congressional opinion appearing only in the
preliminary part of the statute probably has no effect. See Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952); 2 SUTHDELANW, STATUMR0Y CovsTRsurLo. § 4104 (3d ed.,
Horack 1943). Sen. Ferguson said, however, that the disabilities imposed on the Party
by the Act in effect outlawed it. 100 Cong. Rec. 14087 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954).
30. 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1952).
31. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 360 § 1.
32. The question of the importance of legislative findings as -constitutional facts"
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
here, and are reasonable in the light of the evidence adduced, they will generally
be accorded great weight by the courts.33
TERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES OF TIlE
COMMUNIST PARTY
Section 3 of the CCA provides that "whatever rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties which have heretofore been granted to said [Communist I party or any sub-
sidiary organization by reason of the laws of the United States or any political
subdivision thereof, are hereby terminated . . . *,,a4 This section raises three
has been extensively treated elsewhere. See Note, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 606, 607-15 (1951),
and authorities cited therein (discussion of this issue with reference to the congressional
findings in the ISA).
33. Id. at 610; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11850, D.C. Cir., Dec. 23, 1954, pp. 55-56.
In the debates, Sen. Humphrey suggested a use for the legislative findings aside from
sustaining the constitutionality of the statute. He suggested that Congress' determination
that the Communist Party is part of a conspiracy to overthrow the government of the
United States by violence relieves the Attorney General of the burden of proving this
fact in prosecutions under the Smith Act. 100 Cong. Rec. 14394, 14406-07 (daily ed. Aug.
19, 1954). However, it appears that although congressional findings of fact may be
admissible to prove one or more of the elements of a cause of action or of a criminal
prosecution, these findings may not be regarded as conclusive. 4 WIVGtORE, EvIKNcE §
1352 (3d ed. 1940), 5 id. § 1362; Note, 51 COLUM. L. Rzv. 606 1n.45 (1951). In Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, supra, at 55-56, although the court held
that the evidence presented to the SACB warranted the Board's findings as to the ex-
istence and nature of the world communist movement, the court also intimated that the
congressional findings in § 2 of the ISA were sufficient of themselves to sustain these
findings. As authority for this latter proposition, the court quoted from Galvan v. Press,
supra. However, the Galvan case used the congressional findings in the ISA to uphold
the constitutionality of § 22 of that act, providing for the deportation of alien members
of the Communist Party, and not as the basis for the court's determination of any facts
which the Government had to prove. Before § 22 of the ISA, federal law provided for the
deportation of aliens who were members of an organization which advocated the violent
overthrow of the Government of the United States, and in each case where the Govern-
ment sought to deport an alien member of the Communist Party it was necessary to
show the Party was such an organization. The Galvan case did not say that the congres-
sional findings in the ISA relieved the Government from proving this characteristic of
the Communist Party. Galvan said, rather, that § 22 of the ISA now specifically provide,
for the deportation of alien members of the Communist Party, and the court used the
congressional findings to uphold the constitutionality of this section.
In United States v. Silverman, 23 U.S.L. WEK 2439 (D. Coni. Feb. 23, 1955), in-
volving prosecution of second string Communist leaders under the Smith Act, the defend-
ants apparently argued that the findings in the CCA conclusively established that the
Communist Party and its members advocate the violent overthrow of the Government and
hence amended the Smith Act, thereby rendering it unconstitutional. The court held that
since the indictment was issued before the CCA was passed, it could not affect the Govern-
ment's burden of proof in this case. However, it appears that the findings of fact in § 2
cannot have the effect contended for by the defendants in Silverman. See supra. And the
courts should not permit these findings to be used to satisfy the Government's burden of
proof.
34. The complete section provides:
"Sec. 3. The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors of such party
[Vol, 64 :712
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major questions 35 of interpretation and validity: (1) M\qat "rights, privileges,
and immunities" could the Act embrace? (2) Is the section subject to serious
attack as a bill of attainder regardless of the scope given the "rights, privileges,
and immunities" phrase? (3) Assuming that the section survives such attack,
how broadly should the deprivation of "rights, privileges, and immunities" be
interpreted?
"Rights, Privileges, and Imuzunities" Vhich Might be Encompassed
by Section 3
The cryptic language of the section is of little help in determining all the
rights, privileges, and immunities which it might possibly include. Moreover,
the congressional history offers only limited assistance, since the statements of
various congressmen as to the benefits to be withdrawn were intended to be
merely illustrative rather than enumerative.30 It is necessary, therefore, to look
outside the statute and congressional history to federal and state constitutions
and statutes, for these will indicate all the rights, privileges, and immunities
which the section could encompass. Before this, however, it is necessary to
settle the preliminary question of whether Congress meant to terminate rights,
privileges, and immunities granted by state law as well as those granted by
federal law.
regardless of the assumed name, whose object or purpose is to overthruiw the tGovern-
ment of the United States, or the government of any State, Territory, District, or posses-
sion thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein by force and violence,
are not entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal
bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political sub-
division thereof; and whatever rights, privileges, and immunities which have heretufore
been granted to said party or any subsidiary organization by reason of the laws of the
United States or any political subdivision thereof, are hereby terminated: Provided,
however, That nothing in this section shall be construed as amending the Internal Security
Act of 1950, as amended."
35. An initial problem raised by § 3 is the extent of its application to organization
members. By its terms, the section applies only to organizations. However, it may be
used against members if necessary to make the deprivation against the organizations
effective. See Salwen v. Rees, 23 U.S.L. WEar 2158 (N.J. Super. Ct., Sept. 30, 1954),
aff'd, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2176 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Oct. 11, 1954), applying § 3 to a Communist
candidate for local state office in order to make effective the § 3 denial to the Communist
Party of a place on the ballot. See note 81 infra.
A second question presented by § 3 is whether it applies to state and local Communist
Party organizations as well as to the Communist Party of the United States. Although
the section begins by saying that the "Comuinist Party of the United States, or any
successors of such party" are not entitled to rights, privileges, and immunities, the clause
which actually terminates these rights, privileges, and immunities is directed against "said
party or any subsidiary organization.' This language seems broad enough to include the
Communist Parties of the various states and territories.
36. For statements made by various congressmen, see note 111 infra. When making
these statements, none of the congressmen indicated that lie was enumerating all the de-
privations covered by the Act Rather, they appeared merely to be giving examples of
the divestments that would be effectuated by the CCA.
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Does Section Three Deny the Party State as Well as Federally Granted
Rights, Privileges, and Immunities?
While the language of section 3 37 is ambiguous, it will probably be interpreted
to include the rights, privileges, and immunities granted to the Comnimuini.t
Party by the states as well as those granted to it by the federal government.
Whether it does depends upon the construction to be given the phrase "political
subdivision" 38 in the section's two principal clauses. The section begins by
defining its subject as the "Communist Party ... or any successor of such party
... whose object it is to overthrow the Government of the United States, or
the government of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, or
the government of any political subdivision therein . . . ." Section 3 then states
that such organizations are not entitled to any "rights, privileges. and immuni-
ties ... created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any
political subdivision thereof. .. " and that the "rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties which have heretofore been granted . . . by reason of the laws of the
United States or any political subdivision thereof are hereby terminated."
Because Congress specifically .mentions the states in the first part of section 3
where it also uses the phrase "political subdivision," courts might infer an
intent to exclude the states from the meaning of "political subdivision" as it ap-
pears in the latter two parts of the section. Yet, if "political subdivision" does
not include the states, it could refer only to the territories and the District of
Columbia. But these are also specifically referred to in the first part of section
3. Therefore, "political subdivision" as used in the first part of the section
seems to refer to local government units within the states and territories, while
"political subdivision" as used in the part of section 3 actually terminating the
rights of the Communist Party appears to include the states.
This interpretation seems to accord with congressional intent. Although
Senator Butler said that section 3 "strips the Communist Party of all its rights,
privileges, and immunities under the Constitution of the United States and
all laws of the United States,"39 he and others have also stated that it would
deny the Party a place on the ballot.40 Since the right to appear on the ballot,
whether for state or for federal office, depends on state law.4 ' these congress-
men must have intended that state granted rights be included within section
3's prohibition. 42 Furthermore, construing section 3 to embrace such rights
is in harmony with the obvious desire of Congress to enact as broad a depriva-
tion as possible.
37. See full text of § 3 quoted in note 34 supra.
38. "Political subdivision" does not appear to have any established meaning. See 32
WORDS AND PRASES 815 (1940); 40 id. at 352. It has been defined to include states.
See 45 STAT. 1064 (1928), 43 U.S.C. 617k (1952). For a discussion of its meaning for
income tax purposes, see Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 19,14)
Abad v. Puerto Rico Communications Authority, 88 F. Supp. 34, 40 (D.P.R. 1950).
39. 100 Cong. Rec. 14079, 14081 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954).
40. See note 111 infra.
41. See note 47 in!ra.
42. This conclusion is fortified by Sen. Ferguson's statement that under the new law
the Party "would not be able to make any leases or hire people under contract . . ." or
I[Vol. 64: 712
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State Rights, Privileges, and Intmunitics [Vhich light Be Terminated
State constitutions and laws present one source from which the "rights,
privileges, and immunities" mentioned in section 3 might arise. Because un-
incorporated associations such as the Communist Party 43 are not considered
legal entities at common law, they do not have a common law right to sue
and be sued in civil suits in the state courts ;44 nor to hold or convey prop-
erty;43 nor to enter into contracts in their own names.40 In addition to statutes
giving the Part , the right to appear on the ballot,4 7 many states now have laws
giving unincorporated associations the capacity to sue and be sued in their
"enter into any contractual relations . . .:' 100 Cong. Rec. 140,8 (daily ed. Aug. 17,
1954). Since the Party, as an unincorporated association, has no capacity to enter into
a contract at common law, it can only do so if given this right by state statutes. See
notes 46 and 51 infra and accompanying text.
43. The Communist Party of the United States and the state organizations are unin-
corporated associations. Letter from Mr. John J. Abt, Attorney for the Communist
Party in the appeal from the order of the SACB requiring tie Party to register as a
"Communist-action" organization, to the Yale Law Journal, dated Feb. 21, 1955, on
file in Yale Law Library.
44. CANiE, PARTNERSHIP § 100 (2d ed. 1952); WmGuin GroN-, U:a::.Co: nma x
AssocIATIONS AxD BusINEss TRusTs 425-36 (2d ed. 1923) ; Starr, Legal Staltus of Amcri-
can Political Parties, 34 A-m. POL_ SCL REv. 439, 6S5, 693 (1940) ; Notes, 35 C.w'v. L
Rnv. 115 (1947) ; 30 N.C.L. REv. 465 (1952) ; 7 C.J.S., Associations, §§ 36-6 (1937); cf.
Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928) ; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Cual
Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
45. 3 CASNER, armycAx LAw OF PRoPEn § 12.78 (1952); 4 id. § 18.50; Cr m.F,
PARTNERSHIP § 98 (2d ed. 1952); LLOYD, Un.1NcoRroFATFi) AssO IATIo:-s 165-78 (1939);
PATTON, TiTL.s § 228 (1938) ; 1 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 130-31 (1949) ; WNxanII:G -
TON, op. cit. stpra note 44, at 336-37; 7 C.J.S., Associations § 14 (1937); Starr, sufra note
44, at 694. But see Jeffery v. Ehrhardt, 210 S.C. 519, 43 S.E,2d 483 (1947).
However, there is some authority supporting the right of unincorporated associations
to hold personal property in their own names. La, retta v. Holcombe, 93 Ala. 503, 12 So.
789 (1893) ; Hadden v. Dandy, 51 N.J. Eq. 154, 26 Atl. 464 (Ct. Ch. 1893), aff'd, Dandy
v. Methodist Society of Ireland, 51 N.J. Eq. 330, 30 Atl. 429 (Ct. E.A. 193); White
v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329, 356 (N.Y. 1868) ; WRIGHTINCTON, op. Cit. supra note 44, at 351-
55; Note, 46 AicH. L. REv. 824, 825-26 (1948). This common law right of the Party
may also be terminated by § 3 of the CCA. Whether it is would depend on how broadly
the courts construe "laws" in § 3. See note 34 supra. Nothing in the legislative history
indicates what Congress' intent on this question was.
Mlost associations use the trust device to hold property. The title i. in tie trumtee
for the use of the members of the organization. LLmoa, op. cit. suj'ra, at 165-78; WitiuT-
iNGTox, op. cit. supra, at 33743.
46. Hunt v. Adams, 111 Fla. 164, 149 So. 24 (1933) ; I. W. Phillips & Co. v. Hall,
99 Fla. 1206, 128 So. 635 (1930); Franklin Paper Co. v. Gorman, 76 Pa. Super. 276
(1921) ; LLOYD, op cit. supra note 45, at 133-48; Starr, supra note 44, at t,94; 7 C.J.S..
Associations § 15 (1937).
47. State law determines the parties and candidates which can apptar on the hallut
for both federal and state offices. Under Article I, § 4 of the United States Constitutiun,
the states are empowered to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of Hulding
Elections for Senators and Representatives ...." Although Article I, § 4 gives Cungress
the power to alter State regulation of the election of Senators and ReprecntativL,, and
although in the past Congress has exercised this power, at present, these electiuns ar,
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own names or in the name of a designated officer. 48 However, although many
states have given certain unincorporated associations the right to take and
hold property,49 very few of these statutes are broad enough to cover political
parties.5 0 Moreover, it seems that no state has made a general statutory grant
to unincorporated associations of the right to enter into contracts in their
own names.5 ' But any other rights which are or will be granted to unin-
largely controlled by state law. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917). 18 Am.
Ju., Elections § 9 (1938). In addition, the states are given exclusive power to rgulate
the election of presidential electors by Article II, § 1 of the Constitution.
Most states have statutes allowing parties to have their candidates placed on the ballot
if the party received a certain percentage or number of votes for a specified office in the
preceeding election. Most states also provide an alternative method of securing a place
on the ballot for those parties which did not get the requisite number of votes in the prior
election. Usually this method consists of securing a certain number of signatures on a
nominating petition. See Starr, supra note 44, at 452-55, 685-90; Comment, 57 YALE L.J.
1276 (1948) ; Notes, 37 COLUm. L. REV. 86 (1937) ; 34 VA. L. Ray. 450, 450-52 (1918).
See also MacDougal v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), where the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of an Illinois statute which required a certain number of signatures
on the petition from each county in the state before a party could appear on the ballot
for federal and state office.
For a suggestion of other rights of political parties which may be derived fron state
law, such as the right to nominate candidates, see Starr, supra note 44, at 447-52.
48. WRIGHTINGTON, Op. cit. supra note 44, at 436-39; 4 Am. Jun., ,lssociations and
Clubs, § 47 (1936). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7797 (1949) (suits in name of associa-
tion) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2.78-1 (1937) (same) ; VT. Rv. STAT. § 1565 (1947) (same);
N.Y. GEN. Assoc. LAW §§ 12, 13 (suits in name of president or treasurer).
49. E.g., VA. CODE § 40-63 (1950) (unions) ; id. § 57-7 (religious organizations);
Wvo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 44-907 (1945) (all unincorporated associations except those
which are seditious, political, or revolutionary in character, and those which are organized
to carry on business). See also 1 POWELL, REAL PuioPtiT 490-91 nn.39-40 (1949).
50. Most statutes are limited to religious, charitable, and benevolent associations. See
note 49 supra. However, a provision in the Louisiana Civil Code, LA. Civ. CoDE art. 44b
(1952), granting unincorporated associations the right to "acquire and possess estates"
appears to be broad enough to include political parties. See United Brotherhood v. Stephens
Broadcasting Co., 214 La. 928, 39 So. 2d 422 (1949) (applying the provision to a labor
union). Also, in Simpson v. James R. Crowe Post No. 27, American Legion, 230 Ala. 487,
490, 161 So. 705, 707 (1935), the Alabama Supreme Court said that provisions in the
Alabama Code granting unincorporated associations the capacity to sue and be sued in
their own names and subjecting such associations' property to the payment of judgments
obtained against them "recognize that unincorporated associations may acquire and hold
property, real and personal ... ." However, later Alabama decisions, without mentioning
the Simpson case, have stated that unincorporated associations cannot take and hold realty.
Hamner v. Carroll's Creek Baptist Church, 255 Ala. 277, 51 So, 2d 164 (1951) ; Vaughn
v. Pansey Friendship Primitive Baptist Church, 252 Ala. 439, 41 So. 2d 403 (1949);
Darby v. Jones, 249 Ala. 104, 29 So. 2d 879 (1947) ; Street v. Pitts, 238 Ala. 531, 192
So. 258 (1939).
51. However, the contract made by an authorized agent of the association is binding
on the members, LLOYD, op. cit. supra note 45, at 134-37; 1 Wu.LISTO , CoNTxAcrs § 308
(1936). In addition, one who has received benefits under a contract made with an unin-
corporated association may be held estopped from denying the lack of capacity in the
association to contract. E.g., State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Mackechnie, 114
F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1940); Lamm v. Stoen, 226 Iowa 622, 284 N.W. 465 (1939) ; Petty v.
Bronswick & W. Ry. Co., 109 Ga. 666, 35 S.E. 82 (1899).
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corporated political associations by state law could also be included within
the scope of section 3.
Federal Rights, Privileges, and Innunities Which Might Be Terminated
There are two sources of federally-created rights, privileges, and immunities:
The Constitution and statutes. Constitutional privileges and immunities are
created by the Fourteenth Amendment and Article IV, Section 2.52 Neither
of these provisions, however, is applicable to the Communist Party. By their
terms they apply to "citizens" of the United States and the states; and
numerous decisions have held that only natural persons are to be considered
citizens under these provisions. 53 However, the Communist Party is presum-
ably granted certain rights by the Constitution. Among these are the right to
due process of law,54 the right to a speedy public trial in a criminal proceed-
ing,5 and probably rights under the First Amendment. 6 But since it does not
52. U.S. CoxsT. amend. XIV, § 1 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; .... ." The "privi-
leges and immunities" involved in this provision are enumerated in the Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
U.S. Co. sT. art. IV, § 2: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privilege-
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." The "privileges and immunities" in-
volved in this provision are enumerated in C',rfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, Xo. 3230
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Also see Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).
53. Cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment: Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 4v,
(1939); Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 2(04 U.S. 359 (1907); The Insurance
Co. I. New Orleans, 13 Fed. Cas. 67, No. 7052 (C.C.D. La. 1870).
Cases involving Art. IV, § 2: Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945);
Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928) ; Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 16S (1WS).
54. U.S. CoxsT. amends. V and XIV, § 1.
Although the Communist Party is an unincorporated association, see note 43 supra,
it would appear that it is entitled to due process. This right of unincorporated associations
was recognized in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee Y. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(concurring opinions of Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas) and in Commnunit
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11M0, D.C. Cir., DLc. 23, 1954,
pp. 25-31.
55. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosccutiuns, the accused siall cnju'
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . ... "
The Sixth Amendment applies only to prosecutions in the federal curt. L.y., 1tM, v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164 (190); EilmiLeder v.
Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 (1890). Assuming this condition is met, it would appcar
that "accused" is broad enough to encompass all defendants, including unincorporated
associations like the Communist Party. The Party would have need uf this right in pros.e-
cutions under § 15 of the ISA, 64 STALT. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 794 (1952), which
subjects communist organizations to a $10,000 fine if they fail to comply with the registra-
tion provisions of the act.
56. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (corp oration hidd
entitled to freedom of speech and press) ; Associated Press v. National LaLor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 103, 133 (1937) (dissenting opinion) (samel. St: also note 54 suLpra.
But see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939).
Other constitutional guarantees may also be applicable to unincorp,rated assoiati.2.
However, some would not appear relevant, since by their nature they can be e.-erci.ed
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seem that Congress could, by statute, deprive the Communist Party of con-
stitutional rights merely because the Party advocates the violent overthrow
of the government, these rights should be considered beyond the possible scope
of section 3.
Federal statutes create at least two relevant rights. The first is the right
to sue or be sued in the federal courts, provided for by Rule 17(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 7 The second is granted by section 315
of the Federal Communications Act,58 which entitles candidates to "equal
time" for radio broadcasts during political campaigns. Although section 3 is
directed only against the Communist Party as an organization and not at its
members, the courts might extend the section to revoke the "equal time"
rights of individual Party members in order fully to effectuate the denial to
the Party of the state granted right to appear on the ballot.59
Bill of Attainder Aspects of Section 3
The success of most of the constitutional attacks which may be made
upon section 3 will depend upon which rights, privileges, and immunities the
courts ultimately include within its scope.10 However, termination of any of
these rights, privileges, and immunities may be the basis for invalidating section
3 as a bill of attainder. 61 Therefore, the bill of attainder issue should be
considered before examining how the courts may delimit section 3.
A bill of attainder is generally described as a legislative act which imposes
punishment upon a named individual or an easily ascertainable group without
a judicial trial.62 Certainly section 3 partially complies with this definition,
since it does not provide for a judicial trial to determine the culpability of the
organizations included within its scope. It is more difficult to ascertain whether
any or all of the deprivations which might be included within section 3 con-
stitute "punishment." One commentator has concluded that the question of
whether the legislature has imposed punishment when it disqualifies individuals
or groups from exercising rights or privileges is to be answered by ascertain-
only by individuals. E.g., the right to bear arms, U.S. CONST., amend. II; the right to
grand jury indictment for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, id. amend. V.
57. This rule provides that the capacity of unincorporated associations to sue and be
sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court sits except
that "a partnership or unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law
of such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or
against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United
States . .. ."
58. 48 STAT. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1952).
59. See note 35 supra.
60. See text pp. 726-30 infra.
61. In this case, depriving the Party of any right, privilege or immunity constitutes
"punishment." See text at notes 74-80 infra. Therefore, each deprivation can be the
basis for a bill of attainder as it is defined in this section of the text.
62. United States v. Lovet, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) ; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867) ; Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 844, 857 (1954).
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ing whether the legislation evinces a "penal intent."0 3 This view is supported
by the purpose and judicial development of the prohibition against bills of
attainder. The constitutional injunction against this type of statute was de-
signed to maintain the separation of the legislative and judicial functions and
thereby preserve to the individual the traditional safeguards of a judicial
trial. 64 Those safeguards are denied when the legislature exceeds its proper
function of defining crime and purports to judge those guilty of the crime.
The courts have regarded certain classes of facts as establishing a legislative
penal intent. One such situation is where the legislature is so indiscreet as
openly to avow its purpose.65 Courts have also found penal intent where the
characteristic causing persons to be disqualified was irrelevant to the activity
from which they were excluded.66  Thus, in C mmzings v. Missouri[0r a
statute prohibiting persons from being ministers if they had aided the Con-
federacy in the Civil War was struck down by the Supreme Court as a bill of
attainder. Even where relevancy existed, courts have discovered penal intent
when the legislature imposed a disqualification after consideration of evidence
as to the character of the proscribed individuals. s In contrast to this latter
type of case where the legislature's actions make clear that it is judging
individuals or groups and deciding that they are deserving of punishment, there
is the situation where the legislature disqualifies a class from certain rights
63. Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 V=P¢n. L. RMy CO3,
608-10 (1951).
64. Id. at 603-05, 610-11; DOuGLAS, Ax ALMANAC OF Limnr 103, 205 (1954); Com-
ment, 63 YALE L.. 844, 845 (1954).
65. See concurring opinion of Justice Franldurter in United States v. Lovett, 323
U.S. 303, 313 (1946) ; see Wlrormuth, supra note 63, at 603.
66. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20 (1367) (voiding a
statute requiring priest to take oath that he did not participate in the Civil War on the
side of the South); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1873) (voiding a
statute requiring persons seeking the use of state judicial processes to file affidavits that
they had not participated in the Civil War on the side of the South) ; cf. Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1389) (upholding a statute providing for the licensing of
doctors and distinguishing Cumminhs on the grounds of relevancy).
When a statute disqualifies a person from the exercise or enjoyment of a right or
privilege because of past conduct, and if the characteristic causing the disqualification
is not relevant to the exclusion from the right or privilege, the statute may also be an
ex post facto law. See Cummings v. Missouri, supra; Pierce v. Carstadon, supra; Cases
v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied sub nom. Velazquez v.
United States, 319 U.S. 770 (1943) (upholding statute punishing certain ex-convicts for
transporting firearms in interstate commerce or receiving firearms so transported) ;
Bauer v. Acheson, 105 F. Supp. 445, 450 (D.D.C. 1952) (statute and regulation governing
the issuance of passports held not an ex post facto law); McAllister, Er Post Facto
Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 CAIF. L. Rm,. 26,9, 279-83 (192).
67. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
68. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), the Supreme Court struch down
as a bill of attainder a provision in an appropriation act prohibiting paying three named
individuals any of the money appropriated. A House committee had found these persons
to be "subversive." Cf. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (167). See also Wtor-
muth, supra note 63, at 610.
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or privileges without intending to penalize the individuals who may fall into
that class. For example, in Hawker v. New York,' 9 where the Supreme Court
upheld a statute prohibiting felons from practicing medicine, the legislature
manifestly was not assessing the characters of individuals and then imposing
a penalty upon them; it was not at all concerned with the persons who were
or might become members of that class. Rather it was enacting a protective
statute on the basis of "general human experience" as to the characteristics
of that class.
70
Even though there is a legislative investigation into the character of indi-
viduals or groups and a disqualification on the basis of the legislature's implicit
determination of culpability, recent cases require that the proscription have
retroactive application in order to constitute punishment. 71 In American Corn-
inunications Ass'n v. Douds,7 2 the Supreme Court upheld section 9(h) of
the NLRA, which restricted the opportunity of Communists to serve as union
officials by denying unions the advantages of the NLRA if their officers re-
fused to take a non-Communist oath. The Court emphasized that this section
was prospective in character, since individuals could serve as union officials
merely by renouncing membership in the Party. 73 It therefore found that
Congress was not imposing punishment for past conduct, but was merely pre-
venting future disruption of interstate commerce.
Section 3 of the CCA appears to fall well within the established definition of
a bill of attainder,74 regardless of which deprivations the section is ultimately
69. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
70 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1898). Also see Dent v. Wcqt
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) ; Wormuth, supra note 63, at 611-13.
71. See Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), where the Court held
prospective and therefore valid a city ordinance requiring oath by city employees that they
do not, or within the past five years have not, advocated or belonged to an organization
which advocates the violent overthrow of the government. There, a provision in tile
city's charter in effect for more than five years made such persons ineligible for public
employment. See also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)
(upheld requirement that union officers take oath that they are not presently nemibers of
the Communist Party in order to qualify their union to use NLRB facilities) ; Albertson
v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
345 U.S. 242 (1953) (upheld Michigan Trucks Act which banned the Communist Party
and its candidates from the ballot) (for further discussion of the Albcrtson ca see note
81 infra) ; Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wash. 2d 767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952) (upheld non-subversive
affidavit prerequisite to candidacy for public office).
72. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
73. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413-14 (1950).
74. Most of the cases involving bills of attainder deal with legislative acts directed
against individuals or groups of individuals. Also, the generally accepted definition of a
bill of attainder is phrased in terms of individuals or members of a group. See note 62
supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the fact that § 3 is directed at an organization
as such, and not at its members, may cause some courts to hold that § 3 cannot be a bill
of attainder. However, such reasoning appears to be erroneous; the courts should not
hesitate to strike down § 3 if they feel it otherwise fits the definition of a bill of attainder.
There do not appear to be any cases in which the courts have refused to invalidate a
legislative act as a bill of attainder merely because it was directed against an organization
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held to include. In those instances where the disqualification of the Party
would be irrelevant to the orderly carrying out of the activities from which it
is excluded, as where the Party is denied the right to sue and be sued or to
take and hold property, a penal intent would be evident.", And even where
the requisite relevancy might be said to be present, as in the denial to the
Party of the right to appear on the ballot, an intent to punish the Party
for its past acts may clearly be inferred from the Act's language and legislative
history.7 6 Congress was not guided by "general human experience" in passing
the CCA.77 It did not establish a proscription in general terms, leaving it to
the judiciary to determine which groups fall into the proscribed class. Rather
it conducted extensive investigations into the Party's character, made findings
expressing a judgment as to that character, 78 determined that the Part),
"should be outlawed,"79 and specifically directed the deprivations against the
Party.80 Finally, since the Party cannot avoid these deprivations by purging
itself, section 3 has retroactive effect within the meaning of the Douds rule.8 '
itself rather than against the individual members. On the other hand, there are indications
in some cases that an organization can be the subject of a bill of attainder. See the con-
curring opinion of Justice Black in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee Y. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 144 (1951). See also Thompson v. Wallin, 196 Misc. 686, 93 N.Y.S2d 274
(Sup. Ct. 1949), which held a state statute to be a bill of attainder as against the Com-
munist Party. Although the latter case .was reversed on appeal, 276 App. Div. 463, 95
N.Y.Sf2d 784 (3d Dept. 1950), affirmed, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E2d 06, appeal dismissed,
342 U.S. 801 (1951), the appellate courts seemed to accept the premise that the organiza-
tion involved, the Communist Party, could be the victim of a bill of attainder but held
for other reasons that it was not. The basic purpose of the constitutional prohibition
against bills of attainder is to preserve the separation of governmental powers and to
assure an accused the safeguards of a judicial trial. See note 64 supra and accompanying
text. This policy is violated as much when all organization is declared guilty of a crime
and punished by legislative fiat as when an individual is the victim of the legislature's
displeasure.
75. In these instances, § 3 would also constitute an ex post facto law. See note 66
supra.
76. In the debates Sen. Butler said: "The bill does not outlaw the Communist Party
by making its activities criminal. It makes the Communist Party impossible. It destroys
all of its rights, privileges, and immunities, and strips it of all legal rights under the
Constitution and the laws of the United States." 100 Cong. Re. 14031 (daily ed. Aug.
17, 1954). Also, Sen. Humphrey said concerning his bill: "We shall have struck at the
snake. We shall hold him in the hollow of our hands .... We shall have the means to
strike a lethal blow at the conspiratorial forces of international communism... " Id. at
13559 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954). Rep. McDonough said, "The Communist movement in
the United States should be wiped out completely." Id. at 13838 (daily a Aug. 16, 1954).
77. See text at note 70 supra.
78. See text pp. 715-16 supra.
79. See text p. 715 supra.
80. CCA § 3, quoted note 34 supra.
81. An important element of the Douds decision holding that the non-communist oath
required by § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act is not a bill of attainder was "the fact that
members of those groups identified in § 9(h) are free to serve as union officers if at any
time they remove the allegiances which constituted a bar to signing the affidavit in the
past .... In the cases relied upon by the union, on the other hand, this Court has empha-
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Despite the fact that section 3 seems clearly to come within the definition
of a bill of attainder, the apparently waning vitality of this constitutional
safeguard 82 and the temper of the times may militate against reinvigorating
it. If the courts hold that section 3 is not a bill of attainder, they will be faced
with the task of determining the scope of the section and of passing upon
the other constitutional problems involved.
Suggested Scope of Section 3
Section 3 declares that the Communist Party is not entitled to "any"
rights, privileges, and immunities, and further states that "whatever" rights,
privileges, and immunities have been granted to it are terminated.8 s If this
comprehensive language is literally interpreted to include all rights, privileges,
and immunities granted to the Party by federal and state law, the unconstitu-
tional deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity would cause the whole
section to fall. 84 Thus interpreted, section 3 would be constitutional only if
sized that, since the basis of disqualification was past action or loyalty, nothing that those
persons proscribed by its terms could ever do would change the results." American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414 (1950). Under § 3 of the CCA, the rights,
privileges, and immunities of the Communist Party are "hereby terminated." Nothing
the Party can do or refrain from doing could take it out of the reach of the statute; and
the congressional history seems to emphasize the punative aspects of § 3 rather than its
preventive potentialities. See note 76 supra. The rationale of the Douds case may be used
to support a finding that § 3 is not a bill of attainder in its application to individual Party
members. For situations where the sanction may be applied to such members, see note 35
and text at notes 58-59 smpra. As in the Douds case, individuals can always resign from
the Party and thus escape whatever disabilities are placed on Party members. In Salwen
v. Rees, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2158 (N.J. Super. Ct., Sept. 30, 1954), aff'd, 23 U.S.L. W m.t
2176 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Oct. 11, 1954), the validity of § 3 was upheld when applied to deny
a Communist candidate a place on the ballot for local state office. Although the bill of
attainder issue was argued, Brief for Appellant, pp. 19-24, Salwen v. Rees, 23 U.S.L.
WEExK 2176 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Oct. 11, 1954), neither the lower court nor the state Supreme
Court mentioned the problem. The! Douds case appears to be ample authority for the
rejection of the argument that § 3 was a bill of attainder as against Salwen, since lie could
purge himself by running under a designation other than that of the Communist Party.
See note 149 infra. However, the Saiwen case is not necessarily authority for the propo-
sition that § 3 is not a bill of attainder as against the Communist Party, which cannot purge
itself, since the Party was not involved in the suit. See also Albertson v. Millard, 106 F.
Supp. 635, 644-45 (E.D. Mich. 1952), where a three-judge district court held that the
provision in Michigan's Trucks Act denying the Communist Party and its nominces a
place on the ballot was not a bill of attainder. Although the Communist Party was a
party to the action, the court appeared to consider the bill of attainder problem only
with reference to individual candidates of the Party. The case was vacated and remanded
by the Supreme Court because the state courts had not had an opportunity to construe
or pass on the validity of the statute. 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
82. For a discussion of the problem of the decreasing effectiveness of the bill of at-
tainder protection, see Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 844 (1954).
83. See text of entire section quoted in note 34 supra.
84. If any right held to be included within the § 3 deprivation is found to be uncon-
stitutionally abridged, the whole section will be rendered unconstitutional; it would be
impossible to separate the unconstitutional portion of the section from the constitutional
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Congress could validly deny the Communist Party every right, privilege, and
immunity granted to it by federal and state laws.
The constitutionality of such a broad deprivation depends in the first place
upon the scope of Congress' delegated powers. Congress certainly can act
to preserve the nation's existence and to provide for its safety,s' and was
obviously thinking in terms of this power in passing the CCA.8 0 It also has
other powers on which it might rest the denial of one or more of the rights
that could be included within section 3. For example, it could be contended
that Congress' power to regulate the "manner" of the election of Senators and
Representatives extends to the barring of the Party from the ballot for these
offices.8 7 However, difficulties would be encountered where state granted
rights are involved, such as the right to sue in state courts or to hold property.
The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states those powers not delegated to
the federal government, and the courts might feel impelled to hold that Congress
has no power to interfere in such areas traditionally regulated only by the
states.88
part. All deprivations are brought about by the same general language, that is,
"Whatever rights, privileges and immunities which have heretofore been granted... are
hereby terminated." Hence, even with the liberal separability clause in § 12 of the CCA,
permitting the remainder of the Act to stand if the application of the Act to "any person
or circumstance is held invalid," see note 108 infra, it would appear U be impossible to.
sever from § 3 the deprivation of any particular right, since it is impossible to t' er
the part of the statute which brings about the unconstitutional divestment without alsu
severing the portion which imposes valid deprivations. Although cases have used a selara-
bility clause such as that in § 12 to bolster a construction of a statute that would render
it constitutional, see note 110 infra, and have stated that such a clause can be used tu sever
unconstitutional portions of a statute, Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 2&,M U.S. 165,
183-85 (1932) ; Williams v. Sandard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 242 (1929) ; Chicago 11oard
of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 (1922), apparently no cases have used a separability
clause to "sever" particular unconstitutional applications of certain language in a statute
from other valid applications. However, if the courts do use the separability clause in
§ 12 to sever unconstiutional applications of § 3, then even if the "all" language in § 3 is
literally construed, the courts can merely strike down the unconstitutional applications and
leave the others intact. The result would be the same as where the separability clause
is used to construe the language in § 3 so as to render it constitutional. See note 110
infra.
85. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1950); Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11850, D.C. Cir., Dec. 23, 1954, pp. 9-10.
See also Burrough v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1934).
86. The findings in § 2 of the Act which are concerned exclusively with the subversive
nature of the Communist Party and its threat to the nati,,nal safety. see te:l-t p. 71
supra, strongly indicate that Congress was probably thinking in terms kf it power tu
provide for the national safety when it enacted the CCA.
87. See text at note 152 infra.
88. The Tenth Amendment does not impose any limitation on the puwers uf th.
federal government. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1946); Fernandez v. Wiener,
326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 10D, 123-24 (1941). It
merely gives doctrinal body to an objection that Congress has no power at all to act in
certain areas. It "states but a truism that all is retained which Ias not blen surrendered."
United States v. Darby, supra. Thus if Congress has power to act in a given area, nwe
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Even if Congress is attempting to combat an evil within the range of its
authority, the courts must ascertain whether denying the Party all its rights,
privileges, and immunities is reasonably related to the relief sought, or whether
it is arbitrary and discriminatory; for this is the test of substantive due pro-
cess.8 9 Congress may certainly meet the danger posed by organizations dedi-
cated to the forceful overthrow of the legally constituted government by exer-
cising its power to preserve the nation's safetyY0 And in applying the sub-
stantive due process test, a court might hold that because the basic purpose
of the Party is to overthrow the government, the denial of all the Party's rights,
privileges, and immunities, including those involving peaceable activities, is
reasonably related to securing the national safety. The proper approach, how-
ever, seems to require a court to find a reasonable relationship between the
deprivation of each right, privilege, or immunity and the evil which Congress
seeks to prevent. This application of the due process test permits Congress to
disable an organization from endangering national security, but precludes any
possibility of arbitrary legislative action. Such an approach appears to be
supported by the decision in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board,91 where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
Internal Security Act;92 this statute, like the CCA, imposes a number of
sanctions upon proscribed organizations and their members . 3 Thus, if the
valid objection can be raised because of the fact that it thereby enters a field which
ordinarily has been regulated by the states. Case v. Bowles, supra; Bowles v. Willing-
ham, 321 U.S. 503, 521-23 (1944) (concurring opinion by Justice Rutledge); United
States v. Darby, supra, at 114, 123-24; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S.
146, 156 (1919). However, where the federal government seeks to intervene in an area
long regulated only by the states, the courts may refuse to find that Congress has power
to do so.
89. E.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 391-92 (1950);
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
90. See note 85 supra.
91. Civil No. 11850, D.C. Cir., Dec. 23, 1954.
92. In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11850,
D.C. Cir., Dec. 23, 1954, the court, in upholding the ISA, appears to have included in its
treatment of the First Amendment the requirement that each of the sanctions imposed
upon the Party be reasonably related to a substantive evil which Congress has power to
prevent. Id. at 10, 15-16, 32. Reasonable relationship is usually a pertinent inquiry ill
determining whether a statute meets the requirements of substantive due process tinder the
Fifth Amendment. See note 89 supra. However, the court treats the due process issue
separately in another portion of the opinion. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, supra, at 25-31. Since the court felt that it was necessary for each sanction
to be reasonably related to a legitimate congressional end, the inclusion of this test under
the First Amendment rather than under the Fifth does not appear to be very important,
The Communist Party case would still appear to require that each sanction imposed by
the Communist Control Act be reasonably related to a substantive evil which Congress
can prevent, regardless of whether this is said to be required by the First or the Fifth
Amendment.
93. For sanctions imposed upon members, see text pp. 745-46 infra.
For sanctions imposed upon organizations, see provisions cited in the notes 267-68, 271
infra.
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deprivation under the CCA is of a right such as the right to hold property
or to sue and be sued in the state courts, the exercise of which does not seem
to endanger the nation or to be related to any other evil which Congress may
combat,94 the courts may hesitate to find the necessary relationship between
the restriction and the achievement of a proper legislative end.":
Moreover, if the section is given a comprehensive coverage, a serious First
Amendment problem will arise. Although section 3 does not by its terms
specifically limit the exercise of First Amendment rights, some of ihe depriva-
tions it imposes upon the Communist Party would make it difficult for the
Party to operate as an effective organ of political expression and would pre-
sumably discourage members from continuing their affiliation. 0 The courts
may well find that these effects constitute an abridgement of First Amendment
rights.97 Such a finding would necessitate an initial inquiry as to whether the
activities restricted involve lawful and peaceable conduct. In De Jonge v.
Oregon,98 the Supreme Court held that the right of the Communist Party to
engage in peaceable assembly and lawful discussion could not be curtailed,
despite the fact that the general objective of the Party was to overthrow the
government by force. Thus, if any of the deprivations in section 3 constitute
limitations on First Amendment rights, and if any of them involve solely
lawful and peaceable activity, De Jonge would appear to require the whole
section to be voided as violative of the First Amendment.
Even if a literal interpretation of section 3 would not result in its invalida-
tion under the De Jonge rationale, it would intensify the seriousness of the
remaining First Amendment questions. Some of the deprivations which would
be effected by a compr.ehensively construed section 3, such as the right to
94. For a possible argument that the deprivation of the right to appear in the federal
courts may be reasonably related to a valid congressional purpose, see notes 139-42, 147
infra and accompanying text.
95. Although the Supreme Court now seldom strikes down legislation as violative
of substantive due process, especially in the area of economic regulation, Note, 24 I:w. LJ.
451 (1949), the test is still applied and must be satisfied. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 261 (1952) ; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 32., 390-93
(1950). And if the courts accept the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Communist Party
v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11850, Dec. 23, 1954, see note 92 supra,
the question of reasonable relation will also be a pertinent inquiry under the Firnt Amuld-
ment.
96. For example, the right to sue to enforce First Amendment rights; the right of
Communist Party candidates to equal radio time, see notes 53-59 supra and aceunipanyitig
text; and the right to appear on the ballot, see note 47 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Starr, The Legal Status of American Political Parties, 34 Ami. POL Sci. Rzv.
439, 444 and nn. 32-33 (1940).
98. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
In De Jonge the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute applied to punish mem-
bers of the Communist Party for presiding at a meeting of the Party involving peaceable
assembly and lawful discussion. The Court stated that notwithstanding the fact that the
Communist Party's objective was the violent overthrow of the government, the participants
n a meeting called by the Party could not be punished for the lawful exercise of their rights
of speech and assembly. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363-46 (1937).
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appear on the ballot, 9 might be regarded as "direct" abridgements of First
Amendment rights. The strict "clear and present danger" test of United States
v. Dennis' 0 would have to be applied to such sanctions. Even if the courts
hold that First Amendment rights are only "indirectly" limited by a broadly
interpreted section 3, the Douds 101 case would require the courts to judge the
section by balancing the seriousness of the restraints against the substantiality
of the public interest involved.10 2 The more severe the restraint, the more
probable a judicial holding that the public interest protected is outweighed.' °"
Hence, although the First Amendment question would be present even if
section 3 were limited to include fewer deprivations than its comprehensive
language literally allows, such a limitation would make the problem less critical.
Many of the constitutional questions created byiving section 3 a compre-
hensive interpretation could be avoided by limiting the section's applicability
to only federally granted rights. This would eliminate the Tenth Amend-
ment problem. It would also lessen the risk of section 3 being struck down
as violative of substantive due process as well as the First Amendment, since
fewer rights would be denied the Party. It is conceivable that the courts will
resort to such a construction to save the section. This, however, is both im-
probable and undesirable in view of the fairly clear congressional intent to
terminate state as well as federal rights.104
A much more satisfactory solution would be to limit the section to only
those rights, privileges, and immunities which Congress can constitutionally
deny the Party. Such a construction would be in accord with the well estab-
99. However, the Supreme Court has apparently settled the First Amendment prob-
lem in regard to this deprivation in favor of the restriction. See note 162 infra and accom-
panying text.
100. 341 U.S. 494, 508-11 (1951).
101. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
In Douds, there was no direct restriction on the exercise of First Amendment rights,
However, the Court felt that § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act in effect would require
union leaders to renounce Communism in order to retain their positions in the union,
and thereby would discourage the exercise of political rights protected by the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 392-93, 399. Similarly the CCA may not directly abridge freedom of speech
or assembly. However, the sanctions imposed upon members of the Communist Party by
§ 4 of the Act and the denial to the Party of all its rights, privileges, and immunities
under § 3 certainly do much to discourage the free exercise of politcial rights which are
protected by the First Amendment.
102. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-400 (1950).
103. In Douds, the Court concluded that the restraints on First Amendment rights
were not great enough to override the need for unburdened interstate commerce, because
"in this legislation, Congress did not restrain the activities of the Communist Party as a
political organization; nor did it attempt to stifle beliefs .... Section 9(h) touches only
a relative handful of persons, leaving the great majority of persons of the identified
affiliations and beliefs completely free from restraint. And it leaves those few who
are affected free to maintain their affiliations and beliefs subject only to possible loss of
positions which Congress has concluded are being abused to the injury of the public by
members of the described groups." American Communications Ass'n Y. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 404 (1950).
104. See text at notes 41-42 supra.
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lished doctrine that, wherever possible, the courts will interpret a statute in
such a way as to preserve its constitutionality. 105 In implementing this
principle, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed the language of many
broadly worded statutes' G In the case of the CCA, the suggested interpre-
tation would not be strained. There is nothing in the legislative history of
section 3 compelling the courts to hold that the section includes all rights,
privileges, and immunities. Expressions of intent as to the coverage of section
3 are quite sketchy.10 7 However, the liberal separability clause in section 12,1"
while apparently not of itself authorizing a restrictive interpretation of section
3,109 does indicate a general congressional intent that such a construction be
adopted if a broad interpretation would result in the in-alidation of the entire sec-
tion.1 0 Therefore, a construction of section 3 that limits it to those rights, privi-
leges, and immunities, both federal and state, which Congress can constitutionally
105. Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1950) ; American Communicativns
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 407 (1950) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis) ; Unitcd 1!ates v. Dela-
ware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (190) ; Parsons v. Bedford, 2S U.S. (3 PeL) 433,
448 (1830); SUTHERLAND, STATUTroRY CONSTR 'CxON § '3 (2d ed., Lewis 1!04).
106. In one case, half of an evenly divided Supreme Court gave a very liberal cun-
struction to seemingly absolute language in order to presLrve the constitutionality oi a
statute. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927) (opinion of Justice Hvlmes).
Other cases have limited broad language in statutes in order to render them constitutional.
See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Rumlcy, 345 U.S.
41 (1953); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
107. There are only a few general remarks in the debates using the "all" language of
the statute. See remarks by Sen. Ferguson, 100 Cong. Rec. 14037-8S (daily cd. Aug. 17,
1954), and Sen. Butler, id. at 14079, 14081. Moreover, congressmen stated generally that
the CCA would "outlaw" the Party. See remarks by Sen. Butler, id. at 14032, and by
Reps. Reed and McDonough, id. at 13836, 13838 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954). However,
little was said to elucidate on these general statements.
Some specific examples were given as to the effect of § 3, such as the denial to the
Party of the right to sue and be sued, to appear on the ballot, or to contract. See note
111 infra. Here too, the statements were general, and the scope of the specified depriva-
tions was not made clear; it was not e.\plained whether the Party would be denied the
right to sue in the federal or state courts, or both; or whether it was denied a place on
the ballot for federal or state office or both, although Rep. Celler said the new law would
prevent the Party from appearing in "any elections." 100 Cong. Rec. 13837 (daily ed.
Aug. 16, 1954).
108. CCA § 12 provides:
"If any provision of this title or the application thereof to any person or circumstances
is held invalid, the remainder of the title, and the application of such provision to other
persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby."
109. See note 84 supra.
110. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court narrowly co',strued
a statute in order to limit its application and hence avoid dcclaring it unconstitutional. It
used a severability clause similar to the one in § 12 of the CCA as an indication of
Congress' intent to have the act "operate on this narrower basis, even if a broader
application ... were not permissible." Id. at 620-21. See also Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62-3 (1932) ; United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 1950), altd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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deny the Party is as reasonable an effectuation of congressional intent as is
possible. If this interpretation is given section 3, the courts will have to ex-
amine the specific right, privilege, or immunity involved in any given case to
ascertain whether its termination by Congress would be constitutional. If they
find that the deprivation would be unconstitutional, then section 3 will be
construed as not requiring it. Similarly, if the denial of a particular right,
privilege, or immunity is found to be unconstitutional only in certain circum-
stances, then section 3 will be construed as not terminating the right, privilege,
or immunity in -those instances.
Constitutionality of Various Possible Applications of Section 3
It would be unfeasible to discuss here the constitutionality of every depriva-
tion of right, privilege, or immunity that section 3 might effect. It is appro-
priate, however, to consider the application of section 3 to the right to sue and
be sued and the right to appear on the ballot, for these were the rights most
often mentioned in the congressional debates."'
The Right to Sue and Be Sued
The denial of the right to sue and be sued in civil suits is subject to at least
one fairly obvious exception. Under section 14 of the ISA, an aggrieved
party has the right of appeal to the courts from any order entered by the
Subversive Activities Control Board." 2 This right is preserved to the Commun-
ist Party and its subsidiaries by the specific provision in section 3 of the CCA
which stipulates that nothing in it shall be construed as amending the ISA1 0
An examination of the possible sources of congressional authority is neces-
sary to determine if the Party may be foreclosed from resort to the courts in
all situations other than proceedings under the ISA. If these sources are found
inadequate in any instances, then, under the theory that the courts will inter-
pret section 3 as extending only to those rights which Congress may constitu-
tionally deny the Party, the section will be regarded as not terminating the
right to sue or be sued in those instances. There are three grounds which
might support the validity of this deprivation: (1) Congress' power to preserve
the existence and safety of the nation;" 4 (2) its power to regulate the juris-
diction of the federal, and in some instances, the state courts ;ll (3) its power
to terminate any right it has granted by statute.";
111. Several congressmen said that § 3 would prevent the Party from appearing on
the ballot. See remarks of Rep. Celler, 100 Cong. Rec. 13837 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954)
and Sens. Kefauver and Butler, id. at 14082 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954). It was also stated
that § 3 would deprive the Party of the right to sue and be sued in the courts. See rc-
marks of Sens. Kefauver and Butler, supra. In addition, Sen. Ferguson suggested that
§ 3 denies the Party the right to enter into any contractual relations. Id at 14088.
112. 64 STAT. 1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 793 (1952).
113. See note 34 supra.
114. See note 85 supra.
115. U.S.CoNsT. art. III. See also notes 120-21 in!ra.
116. See note 143 infra.
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(1) Under the first of these powers, Congress has broad authority to cope
with all situations endangering the nation. Consequently, it is clear that
Congress may meet any threat to national safety engendered by activities of
the Communist Party.J1 7 However, due process demands that the means which
Congress adopts be reasonably related to this legitimate purpose."n  It is diffi-
cult to see how the orderly participation of the Communist Party in federal
or state court proceedings is even remotely related to the safety of the
nation. When this consideration is coupled with the fact that denying the
Party the right to sue and be sued would probably preclude innocent non-
Communist plaintiffs from securing judicial redress against the Party, 1 9 it
seems unlikely that courts will hold the deprivation to be a valid exercie of
Congress' power to protect the nation.
(2) Article III of the Federal Constitution gives Congress broad authority
to create and delimit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 0^ In addition,
Congress can grant sole jurisdiction to the federal courts, to the exclusion of
the state courts, over cases coming within the federal judicial powers as
enumerated in Article III, Section 2.121
117. See note 85 supra.
118. See note 89 supra.
119. It was stated in the debates that the Party cannot "sue or be sued" in the cJurt_..
See note 111 supra.
120. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922) ; United States v. Union
Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 602-03 (1878) ; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (180) ;
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (8 How.) 235, 245 (1845); Bunx, JuiusDrcriuN %:,D PTrr-ct;
OF THE COURTS OF THE UxITM STATES 9-11 (5th ed. 1949); Hart, The Power of Con-
gress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise it Dialectic, 6 Hmiv.
L. Rxv. 1362 (1953).
Congress may also make "exceptions" and "regulations" concerning the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but may not alter its original jurisdiction. Ex paric
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Bu.NN, op. cit. supra at 11-13.
121. Although there is general language in the decisions to the effect that Congress
has the power to vest in the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over any cases coming
within the federal judicial powers set forth in Article III, Plaquemines Fruit Co. v.
Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 517-18 (1898) ; The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429
(1866), Congress apparently has never withdrawn from the state courts jurisdiction
over diversity cases, Bumx, op. cit. supra note 120, at 100-01. However, it has used this
authority to deny state courts jurisdiction over suits in admiralty: 63 STAT. 101 (19491,
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952); The Moses Taylor, supra; patent cases: 62 ST.T. 931 (1943),
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1952); Note, 31 COLu1r. L. Rnv. 461 (1941); and price control
cases: 56 STAT. 31 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 923-24 (1946) ; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S.
182 (1943). In general, see BuNx, op. cit. supra, at 100.03.
In some cases Congress has exercised its Article III powers to deny both federal and
state courts jurisdiction over certain cases arising from federal statutes. Thus, fur ex-
ample, Congress restricted the jurisdiction of federal and state courts in cases involving
the validity of price regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, vesting
exclusive jurisdiction over such cases in a single specially created federal court. See 5t.
STAT. 32-33, 50 U.S.C. App. § 924(d) (1952) ; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) ;
Lockerty v. Phillips, supra; HART & WECHsLE , THE FEDERAl. COURTS AN) THE FEW.L%
Sys=, 295-300 (1953). And suits under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1933, 52 STAT.
1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952), were excluded from state and federal courts by the Portal-
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Termination of the right to sue and be sued could conceivably be regarded
as an exercise by Congress of its Article III powers. Under this view,
section 3 might be held to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts so
as to deny them authority to hear cases in which the Communist Party is a
litigant;122 and it might exclude all such cases from state court jurisdiction
if they fell within the federal judicial powers. 123 But it would clearly not inter-
fere with the right of the Party to sue and be sued in the state courts in non-
diversity cases which involve purely state questions.
Interpreting section 3 as an exercise of Congress' Article III powers, how-
ever is not very acceptable. This construction would require a soewhat
strained interpretation of the simple phrase terminating the Party's rights,
privileges, and immunities.124 There is nothing in the wording or legislative
history of the section to indicate that Congress intended to resort to its Article
III powers when it enacted section 3.125 Moreover, it is not at all clear
whether Congress has the authority under Article III completely to preclude
a particular individual or group from obtaining adjudication of all matters falling
within the federal judicial power. Congress has never attempted this. 2 0 In soie
cases it denied everyone a particular remedy, but the deprivation was not
absolute since other remedies were available.127 In one case all remedies to
enforce a particular right were withdrawn. The Portal to Portal Act of
to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 85, 29 U.S.C. § 252 (1952). See, Seese v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 168 F2d 58 (4th Cir. 1948) ; HART & WECISIUR, op. cit. supra at 300-02; (f.
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887
(1948).
122. See note 120 supra.
123. See note 121 supra.
124. Unlike provisions such as FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), granting unincorporated associa-
tions such as the Party the capacity to sue and be sued in the courts, it is not clear that
statutes which grant federal and state courts general jurisdiction over certain classes of
cases confer "rights" or "privileges" on the Party.
125. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
126. When a state attempted to deny persons who fought on the side of the South
during the Civil War the right of access to the state courts, it was struck down as an
ex post facto law. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 82 Am. Dec. 65 (1862). However, the
state constitution, unlike that of, the United States, specifically guaranteed all persow.
free access to the state courts and this provision was also relied on by the court in holding
the law unconstitutional. Many states have similar constitutional provisions. 11 Ati. J tip.,
Constitutional Law § 326 (1937). See also Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234
(1872) (Virginia statute requiring oath that applicant had not participated in the Civil
War on the side of the South held to be a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law).
127. In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1952),
as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 146, 155, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 160(j) (k), §§ 178-80 (1952), Congress employed its Article III powers to restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant injunctions in certain instances. See Lauf v.
E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note
121, at 295. And under §§ 203-04 of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 STAr.
32-33, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 923-24 (1952), the state courts and the regular federal courts
were denied jurisdiction over suits to enjoin or determine the validity of price regulation.
promulgated under the act; but a special Emergency Court of Appeals was established
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1947 '2 terminated certain overtime pay rights to which employees were
entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,' and also deprived
the federal and state courts of jurisdiction over any suit brought to enforce
the extinguished rights.'30  In Battaglia v. Gcneral Motors Corp.,1'3  the
government contended that the Act's limitation of jurisdiction was valid re-
gardless of the constitutionality of the direct extinguishment of the overtime
rights.'3 2 The Second Circuit, in rejecting this argument, stated that this
denial of access to the courts would be a valid exercise of Congress' Article III
powers only if it did not result in the unconstitutional divestment of a right
which the parties sought to enforce.' 33 The court then held that the statute
was constitutional whether the overtime rights arose exclusively from federal
statute or were also founded on contract; for Congress my legally terminate
any right grounded on a federal statute, and in this case it could modify the
contracts because of their effect on interstate commerce. 3 4 Battaglia establishes
that Article III apparently will not support a sweeping denial to the Com-
munist Party of access to the courts. For the exclusion to be valid, the right
which the Party is seeking to enforce must be one whicl Congress could
destroy directly.'3 5 While Congress usually has this power over rights origi-
nating solely from federal statutes, at least as long as its action is not patently
arbitrary or capricious, 30 it does not generally have it, for example, over
ordinary property rights.'37 The restriction established by Battaglia is emi-
nently reasonable, since otherwise Congress could effectively abridge rights
which it could not terminate directly, simply by denying the owners of such
rights judicial remedies to enforce them.13s
by the act and given exclusive jurisdiction over such suits. See Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503 (1944) ; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) ; Lockerty v. Phillips,
319 U.S. 182 (1943); HART & WECrsLE, op. cit. supra note 121, at 295-300. See also
Hart, supra note 120, at 1366-67.
128. 61 STAT. 85 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 252 (1952).
129. 52 STAT. 1064 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952).
130. See HaRT & VEcHSLER, op. cit. supra note 121, at 300-02.
131. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 87 (1948).
132. Battaglia v. General 'Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948).
133. Ibid.
134. Id. at 259-62.
135. See also Mfanosky v. Bethlelem-Hinghanm Shipyard, Inc., 177 F.2d 529, 532 (1st
Cir. 1949), holding that Congress could not indirectly terminate overtime lay rights under
the Portal-to-Portal Act by denying courts jurisdiction over cases invulving such rights
unless it could constitutionally extinguish the rights directly. C1. Scese v. Lethlehem
Steel Co., 168 F2d 58 (4th Cir. 1948).
136. For example, it does not appear that Congress could deny an ordinary ta- vx-
emption to all Republicans.
137. Of course, the Government may summarily deprive persons oi their prperty
rights if necessary in time of war or other severe emergency. See United States v. Russell,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1872); Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. Unittd States, 23 U.S.L
NVuEn 2424 (U.S. Ct. Cl. Feb. 8, 1955); Dakota Coal Co. v. Fraser, 2S3 Fed. 415
(D.N.D. 1919), vacated on appeal as moot, 267 Fed. 130 (8th Cir. 1920).
138. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930); Graham & Fustcr V.
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In opposition to the Battaglia restriction, it could be argued that, since Con-
gress might reasonably believe the Communist Party to be an unruly litigant,
it could deny the Party access to the federal courts under any circumstances.
It is true that the maintenance of judicial order and decorum might conceivably
be thought a problem where the Communist Party is a suitor, 89 whereas such
considerations were entirely absent in Battaglia. But Congress made no find-
ings concerning the Party's behavior in the courts, and the paucity of support-
ing facts should lead the courts to reject this suggested basis for total exclusion
from the federal courts. Since the reasonableness of a federal statute is at
issue, however, the contention that the Party's behavior may disrupt judicial
proceedings would probably be aided by a presumption.140 If the presumption
were not overcome, a conflict between a power and a right both normally
constitutional would arise in cases involving the complete deprivation of a
right which Congress could not directly abridge.14 1 Such a deprivation would
occur only where the right is enforceable solely in the federal courts. Congress
has no power to preserve order in the state courts; hence the Battaglia restric-
tion would still be applicable there, and would allow state adjudication of a
right enforceable in both state and federal courts. But where denial of access
to the federal courts totally extinguishes the right, apparently the proper
approach would be to balance the significance of the public policy which
Congress is seeking to effectuate against the importance of the right which
will be curtailed.' 42 Because the complete divestment of a right is involved,
and because the courts have authority to maintain order by use of contempt
Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1931) (dictum) ; Hart, The Power of Congress to Linit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HAir. L. Ri'. 1362, 1371-
72 (1953).
139. During the trial before Judge Medina of the eleven top Communist leaders, there
were several instances of unruly conduct which disturbed the proceedings. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1949, p. 1, col. 3; id., June 14, 1949, p. 1, col. 8; id., June 29, 1949, p. 8,
col. 3; id. Aug. 2, 1949, p. 1, col. 2.
140. Borden's Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209-10 (1934) ; RorrscAuEUra, CONSI-
TUTIONAL LAW 459-60 (1939).
141. If Congress could reasonably believe that order in the judicial system would be
promoted by depriving the Communist Party of the right to sue and be sued, due process
requirements would probably be fulfilled in all those situations where the Party was not
prevented from vindicating rights which Congress could not directly abolish. The CCA
presumably divests the Party of all other rights, and questions of substantive and procedural
due process could not arise from the denial of access to the courts to enforce non-existent
rights. However, procedural due process would obviously be an impediment where the
divestment would result in the inability of the Party to enforce rights which Congress
could not directly eliminate.
142. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124-27 (1866) (conflict between the
exercise of war power to declare martial law and right to trial in the courts resolved in
favor of preserving the civil right); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324, 335
(1946) (concurring opinions of Justice Murphy and Chief Justice Stone) (same) ; United
States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1872) (conflict between government's need
for private property during period of war emergency and the rights of private property
resolved in favor of the government) ; Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. United States, 23
U.S.L. WEEK 2424 (U.S. Ct. Cl. Feb. 8, 1955) (same) ; Dakota Coal Co. v. Fraser, 283
Fed. 415 (1920), vacated on appeal as moot, 267 Fed. 130 (conflict between state's power
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powers, it seems very improbable that the courts would strike tile balance in
favor of the congressional action.
(3) Many decisions have held that a right or privilege dependent for its
existence solely upon a statute can be terminated at the will of the legislature
by the repeal or amendment of that statute.143 Under this theory, tile right
of the Communist Party to sue and be sued in ordinary civil suits in the
federal courts could be revoked by Congress, since unincorporated associations
have this right only by virtue of federal statute. 44 The right of access to state
courts, however, would be unaffected, since it is not derived from federal
law. 145 And even the exclusion from federal courts would probably be invalid
if it would result in the deprivation of a right which Congress could not abridge
directly.' 46 Thus, where the Party seeks to enforce a right which can be
vindicated only in the federal courts, Congress probably cannot deny the
Party a federal adjudication unless it could extinguish the right directly. This
proposition is again subject to the possibility that the courts may say that
Congress could reasonably have assumed that litigation by the Party will be
disruptive of judicial order in the federal courts. If the courts adopt this view,
they should balance the desirability of the CCA as an instrument for maintain-
ing order in the courts against the indirect deprivation to the Party of rights
which Congress could not otherwise take away. 47
Thus, although the precise boundaries of Congress' authority to deny tle
Communist Party the right to sue and be sued are not clear, it is at least
to seize property to provide for the public welfare during an emergency and the rights oi
private property resolved in favor of the state).
143. Chase Securities v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945) (held valid a statute lifting
the bar of the statute of limitations in pending action) ; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620
(1885) (same) ; Ewell v. Daggs, 103 U.S. 143 (1,3) (held valid the repeal of a tury
statute thereby terminating the defense of usury) ; Norris v. Crocker, 54 U.S. (13 Hcw.)
429 (1851) (held valid the repeal of statute giving owner of runaw\ay slaves right to a
penalty against those who aid fugitives, even though action w%-as pending); Sees e v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F2d 58 (4th Cir. 1948) (held valid the termination by Portal-
to-Portal Act of rights to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
144. See text at note 57 supra.
145. See notes 44 and 48 supra and accompanying text.
146. The legislature's power to terminate rights it has granted uould appear to lt
subject to some limitations. For example, even if a right is derived from a statute, the
legislature cannot terminate it after it has become "vested," either by prosecution to final
judgement; or, if it is a right derived from adverse possession, by possession for the statutory
period; or otherwise. See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 311, 315
(1945) ; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623 (1885) ; Battaglia v. General Mttors Corp.
169 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). In addition, although Con-
gress has been said to have unlimited powers to delimit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts which it creates, see note 120 supra, it has been held that it cannot deny a party
access thereto if this would result in the denial of a right Congress could not terminate
directly. See notes 131-38 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 142 supra and accompanying text.
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certain that this power is subject to some strict limitations. Congressional
power to provide for the nation's safety does not permit it to terminate the
Party's right of access to the courts. Nor does its authority under Article III
or its power to terminate rights created solely by federal statute appear to
allow Congress completely to exclude the Party from the courts where such
denial would result in the deprivation of a right which Congress could not
extinguish directly. Since all other rights are presumably terminated by the
CCA anyway, the denial of access to the courts seems to add little to the sanc-
tions otherwise imposed by the Act.' 48 This deprivation will be given broader
scope only if the courts consider the indirect termination of otherwise inviol-
able constitutional rights as a valid inevitable byproduct of a legitimate con-
gressional attempt to prevent disruption of the federal judiciary.
The Right of the Party to Appear on the Ballot
Section 3 may be interpreted to deny the Communist Party the right to
appear on the ballot for either federal or state office. The effect of this depriva-
tion would be to prevent Party members from running under the Communist
Party designation for any federal or state office.140 The legislative history of
the CCA clearly indicates that Congress intended to restrict the Party in its
right to appear on the ballot.150 How far this restriction was meant to extend,
though, is not at all clear.' 5' The delineation of the permissible scope of this
deprivation will pose a knotty problem for the courts.
Federal Offices-Senators and Representatives. There are two grounds on
which Congress may rely to deny the Communist Party and its candidates
a place on the ballot for seats in the Senate and House of Representatives.
These are its power under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution to regulate
148. If the Communist Party is excluded from the courts only in those instances
where Congress could constitutionally deprive it of the underlying right it seeks to enforce,
no substantial limitation on First Amendment rights could result. Therefore, the De
Jonge limitation, see note 98 supra and accompanying text, would not appear applicable.
149. The New Jersey Supreme Court so held in Salwen v. Rees, 23 U.S.L. WEK
2176 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Oct. 11, 1954), affirming 23 U.S.L. WEEK.2158 (N.J. Super. Ct., Sept.
30, 1954). See note 81 supra. The lower court's opinion contained dictum to the effect
that if Salwen had chosen to run without the Communist Party label he could have done
so, see p. 9a of the advance sheet of the Superior Court opinion. There is some legislative
history supporting this conclusion. See remarks of Rep. Celler, 100 Cong. Rec. 13837
(daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954).
150. See note 111 supra.
151. Sen. Kefauver said merely that the Party "could not be placed on the ballot.
100 Cong. Rec. 14082 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954). Representative Celler seemed to go some-
what further when he said "the Communist Party cannot appear on the ballot,... cannot
appear in any elections .... " Id. at 13837 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954). However, this is
all that appears in the legislative history concerning this deprivation. It is not made
clear whether the Party and its candidates are to be denied a place on the ballot for
federal or state office or both.
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the "manner" of holding elections for Senators and Representatives,I 2 and its
power to preserve the safety and existence of the nation.l"a
Article I, Section 4 authorizes the states to prescribe the "Times, Places,
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives"; Congress,
however, is empowered by the same section to alter any of these state regula-
tions and enact its own.154 The right to control the "manner" of holding elec-
tions would seem to include the right to determine who can appear on the
ballot. Since the only source of state power with respect to the election of
Senators and Representatives comes from this section of the Constitution,15
the states presumably are acting under it when they enact statutes prescribing
which parties and candidates can appear on the ballot for federal office.1"0
And the only part of the section which can authorize such control is that allow-
ing the states to regulate the "manner" of holding elections. If the states derive
this power from Article I, Section 4, the federal government, which obtains
the same type of regulatory authority from the section, also has this power1x 7
152. U.S. Coxsz. art. I § 4 states: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators."
153. See note 85 supra.
154. See note 152 supra. See also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)
(federal statute making it a crime to deprive a citizen of a right secured to him by the
Constitution applied to the election of congressmen) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 051
(1884) (same); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (federal regulatory statute to
insure honesty and accuracy in elections in which congressmen were chosen) ; Ex tarte
Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879) (same).
155. See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 280-81 (1921) (concurring opinion
of Justice Pitney).
156. See note 47 supra.
Some states exclude from the ballot candidates who are members of organizations
which advocate the violent overthrow of the government. Other states specifically exclude
the Communist Party and its candidates from the ballot. See Notes, 96 U. PA. L. Rav. 381,
388-91 (1948) ; 34 VA. L. REv. 450, 450-52 (1948). For recent statutes see LA. Ray. STAT.
§ 14:361 (Supp. 1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. Laws art. 85A, § 5 (1951) ; MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 264, § 20 (Supp. 1954); MinC. STAT. ANN. § 28.243(17) (Supp. 1954); N.H.
Rav. LAws c. 193, § 14 (1951) ; TEx. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6889-3, § 6 (Supp. 1954) ;
WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.81.100 (1951). The Supreme Court has not yet passed on the
constitutionality of any of these statutes which extend to federal offices, although it has
upheld the Maryland act which was limited to state offices. Gerende v. Board of Super-
visors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). A lower federal court and the Supreme Court of Vashington
have recently upheld statutes denying the Communist Party a place on the ballot for
federal as well as state offices. Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 345 U.S. 242 (1953) ; Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wash.
767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952). But see Feinglass v. Reinecke, 48 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ill. 1942)
(held unconstitutionally v'ague a statute barring from the ballot political organizations
associated with Communist, Fascist, Nazi, or other un-American principles and which
engage in propaganda desigued to teach the violent overthrow of the government) ; Com-
munist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal. 2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942) (statute barring from the
ballot ariy party using the designation "communist" held unconstitutional as a "special
law").
157. See Note, 37 CoLum. L. Ray. 86, 88 n.16 (1937).
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And the exercise of this power to keep Communist candidates from running
for Congress appears to be reasonably related to the legitimate congressional
purpose of keeping from governmental positions of trust and authority mem-
bers of an organization whose basic objective is violent overthrow of that
government.
The second power on which Congress may rely in excluding Communist
Party candidates from the ballot for the Senate and House of Representatives is
its power to provide for the nation's safety. In section 2 of the CCA, Congress
finds that the Party is the instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the
government by force. 55 In the light of these findings, the courts may well
conclude that barring the Party from the ballot is reasonably related to a
legitimate congressional purpose.1 9
The exercise of these two congressional powers is always subject to cout-
stitutional limitations. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors 100 seems to have
settled a number of constitutional questions arising out of Congress' denial
to Communist Party candidates of a place on the ballot. In that case, in a
short per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court upheld Maryland's Ober Act,
which requires candidates for state office to take an oath that they are not
members of any organization attempting to overthrow by force the govern-
ments of the United States or of Maryland." 1 Although the Supreme Court
did not discuss the issues involved in the case, it affirmed the decision of the
Maryland Supreme Court which had held that the statute did not abridge
freedom of speech, press, or assembly. 0 2 There are no grounds apparent for
distinguishing Gerende merely because it involved a restriction on running
for state rather than federal office.
A more serious constitutional problem exists, however. Nothing in the
United States Constitution stipulates that candidates for Senator and Repre-
sentatives cannot run as Communists. If denying Communist Party candidates
a place on the ballot is regarded as imposing additional qualifications upon
congressional aspirants, as it well might be,10 3 substantial authority indicates
158. See p. 715 supra.
159. See Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635, 642-44 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 345 U.S. 242 (1953) (Michigan Trucks Act barring the
Communist Party and its candidates from the ballot held reasonable) ; Communist Party
v. Peck, 20 Cal. 2d 536, 551, 127 P.2d 889, 898 (1942) (dictum).
160. 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
161. MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAWS art. 85A § 5 (1951).
162. In Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950), which was affirmed in
Gerende, the Supreme Court of Maryland construed the statute so as to limit it to
candidates for state office and to require the candidates to swear that they do not advocate
the violent overthrow of the government of the United States or Maryland. In sustaining
the statute, the court held it did not abridge freedom of speech, press or assembly; nor
attempt to establish guilt by association; nor constitute a bill of attainder. Id. at 195,
76 A.2d at 339-40.
The De Jonge case, see note 98 supra, was not mentioned in either Shub or Gerende,
and would not appear to be applicable since in De longe the exercise of First Amendment
rights did not involve any possible danger to the nation.
163. In Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950), the court limited the
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that it should be held invalid.' 64 However, were prohibiting Communists from
serving in Congress essential to the nation's safety and were the only way to
accomplish this the exclusion of Communist candidates from the ballot, the
courts would probably give effect to the superior interest of preserving the
nation. But in this case no pressing necessity exists that would justify the
courts in disregarding the exclusiveness of the constitutional qualifications.
Each house of Congress is the sole judge of the qualifications and elections of
its members,165 and therefore could probably deny the right to be seated to any
Communist who might by chance be elected. Thus, the absence of any real
need may cause the courts to prohibit Congress from barring the Communist
Party from the ballot for Federal office.
State Offices and Presidential Electors. Although there is much authority
opposed to congressional interference in the election of state officers and presi-
dential electors,ler there are some grounds to support the validity of an in-
junction by Congress against Communist Party candidates running for these
offices. Many commentators and a number of decisions have stated that
Ober Act to candidates for state office because to require congressional candidates to take
an oath that they do not advocate the violent overthrow of the government before they
could appear on the ballot would create an additional qualification for Senators and
Representatives and would thereby render the statute unconstitutional. In Imbrie v. Marsh,
3 N.J. 578, 71 A.2d 352 (1950), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that requiring candi-
dates for state office to take an oath that they do not believe in, or belong to any
organizations which advocate the violent overthrow of the government adds a new qualifica-
ton to those provided in the state constitution, and hence is void. The complete denial to
certain persons of the right to appear on the ballot under the name of their chusen party
appears to be just as much of an additional qualification for office as the requirement
that such candidates take an oath which they could not truthfully take. But see Huntamer
v. Coe, 40 Wash. 2d 767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952), where the court upheld an oath required by
a Washington statute similar to the oath required by the Ober Act of Maryland, but
where the Washington court construed its statute to apply to candidates for Congress.
The court held that since the oath was essentially the same as that required by Article VI,
paragraph 3 of the United States Constitution, no additional qualifications for office were
imposed.
164. THE FEDm AuST No. 60, at 394 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (Hamilton); 1
COO.=, ONSTTrTIONAL LImITATIOxS 139-40 (Stli ed. 1927); IMECHm, PLtrVc OFFCES
AND OFFICERS §§ 65, 96 (3d ed. 1890) ; 1 STORY, COMMENTARMS ON THE CONsTITM UON: OF
TnE UNIrrn STATES § 625 (5th ed., Bigelow 1891) ; Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76
A2d 332 (1950); Cf. Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 71 A2d 352 (1950). See also Letter
to Sen. Mike 'ansfield from the American Law Division of the Library of Congress, Feb.
10, 1954, in 100 Cong. Rec. 13992, 13993-94 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954), advising Senator
Mansfield that denying Communists the right to run for President of the United States
would be void since it would add to the exclusive qualifications for that office provided
in the Constitution.
165. U.S. CoXsT. art. I, § 5.
166. Regarding state officers, see THE FnDamuisr No. 59, at 385 (Modern Library
ed. 1937) (Hamilton) ; 5 ELLIOT, DEaATES 402 (Supp. 1866) ; 18 Ams. Jun., Elections § 8
(1938) ; Maurer, Congressional and State Control of Elections under the Constitution,
16 GEo. L.J. 314, 327-40 (1928) ; Notes, 34 VA. L. REv. 450 (1948) ; 96 U. P.%. L. Rv.
381, 390 (1948): United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) ; Lackey v. United States,
107 Fed. 114 (6th Cir. 1901) ; Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 233, 263 (1921) (dic-
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Congress can regulate in this area only where necessary to preserve the purity
of the election of federal officers chosen in the same election with state
officers, 167 where required to maintain honesty in the election of presidential
electors, 1 8 or where necessary to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 1 9 Most
of the major decisions which so hold arose during the Reconstruction period
following the Civil War, when Congress passed many laws seeking to assure
Negroes their newly acquired right to vote. In very few of these cases was
any source of power other than Article I, Section 4 or the Fifteenth Amend-
ment argued as the basis for congressional interference. 17° In Burroughs vi.
Uniited States,'71 however, the right of self preservation of the federal govern-
ment was suggested as the ground for an act of Congress designed to preserve
the honesty of the election of presidential electors.172 Although previous de-
cisions had said this area belonged exclusively within the realm of state regula-
tion,173 the Supreme Court upheld the statute. 7 4 From this it appears that
denying Communist candidates the right to appear on the ballot for state offices
and for presidential electors might be upheld as a valid exercise on Congress'
power to provide for the national safety. The rational relation between the
turn on concurring opinion of Justice White); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 393
(1879) (dictum).
Regarding presidential electors, see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) ; In re
Opinion of the Justices, 188 Me. 552, 107 Atl. 705 (1919) ; 3 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION-
AL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 936, 938 (2d ed. 1929) ; Maurer, supra, at 324-27; Annot.,
153 A.L.R. 1066 (1944).
167. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) ; Ex parte Perkins, 29 Fed. 900 (C.C.D.
Ind. 1887). However, both cases emphasize that Congress may not enact regulations
having exclusive reference to the election of state officers merely because the elections for
federal and state officers are held at the same time. Ex parte Siebold, supra at 393; Ex parle
Perkins, supra, at 904-05.
168. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1933) ; cf. E.r parle Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651 (1884). See also Annot., 153 A.L.R. 1066, 1077-78 (1944).
169. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) ; Lackey v. United States, 107 Fed,
114 (6th Cir. 1901) ; Maurer, supra note 166.
Congress presumably also has power under the Nineteenth Amendment to legislate to
prevent discrimination among voters because of sex.
170. For cases in which the power to preserve the nation and its governmental institut-
tions was raised as the basis for congressional regulation of of elections, see Burroughs
v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) ; E.r parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (188-1).
171. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
172. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545-48 (1934).
173. See note 166 supra.
174. The statute involved was the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which
required organizations to keep records of contributors and file reports with the glerk of
the House of Representatives if they accepted contributions and made expenditures for the
purpose of influencing the election of presidential and vice-presidential electors in two
or more states. In holding that Congress had the power to pass such a law, the court
stated: "To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to
safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to
deny the nation in a vital particular the power of self-protection. Congress, undoubtedly,
possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the depart-
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exercise of this power and the barring of Communist candidates from the ballot
is apparent. Congress could reasonably believe that the strategic placement of
Communist in state offices would threaten the safety of the United States.,'
Another power upon which Congress might rely as the basis for excluding
Communist Party candidates from the state ballot is its obligation under the
Constitution to guarantee to the states a republican form of government."7 '
The courts have consistently refused to void state action which is attacked un
the ground that it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranty to each state of a
republican form of government, saying that the question of whether this
guaranty has been violated is a problem within the exclusive domain of Con-
gress.' 77 And Congress could reasonably believe that if Communists succeed
in gaining control of a state government, the form of that government would
soon cease to be republican.
If the courts find that Congress has power to regulate these non-federal
elections, the remaining constitutional objections should not prove trouble-
some. The Gerende case would again settle most of the constitutional prob-
lems in favor of the statute. 78 And the vexing question of whether the
statute imposes additional qualifications for office would not be present. The
federal Constitution contains no provision setting forth qualifications for
presidential electors or state officers.' 7 9 And where state constitutions establish
qualifications for local officers, under the supremacy clause these constitutional
provisions would be overridden by a valid federal statute. 80
In Salwen v. Rees,18 ' the only case that has arisen under section 3 of the
ments and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, vhether
threatened by force or by corruption." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545
(1934).
The fact that the Burroughs case did not involve the regulation of the election of state
officers, but only of the election of presidential electors, would not appear to be significant.
If the safety of the nation requires the exclusion of Communists from state office,
Burroughs appears to be good authority to support congressional regulation of the elec-
tions of these officers, even though it has been previously held that this area wvas within
the exclusive province of the state.
175. See note 159 supra.
176. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
177. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Park District, 281 U.S. 74 (1930) ; Mountain Timbvr
Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
178. See notes 160-62 subra and accompanying text.
Also, the De Jonge case is not applicable. See note 162 supra.
179. In reference to the absence in the Federal Constitution of qualifications flu
electors, see Letter to Sen. Mike Mansfield from American Law Division of the Library
of Congress, Feb. 10, 1954, in 100 Cong. Rec. 13993 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954).
180. Valid federal statutes prevail over state constitutional pruvisions. Florida v.
Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1926); Gunn v. Dallnan, 111 F2d 36 (7th Cir. 1948); Antic v.
Tuchbreiter, 414 Ill. 571, 111 N.E2d 836 (1953); Schaffer v. Leimberg, 318 Mass. 39b,
62 N.E.2d 193 (1945).
181. 23 U.S.L. W=Vs_ 2158 (N.J. Super. Ct., Sept. 29, 1954), affd, 23 U.S.L. W t
2176 (N.J. Sup. Ct, Oct. 11, 1954).
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CCA, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the section when applied to
deny a Communist Party candidate for local state office a place on the ballot.
Although the court did not discuss the source of congressional authority for
this regulation, Congress' power to preserve the safety of the nation was
argued 182 and was probably viewed by the court as determinative.
Thus, although Congress may not be able to refuse Communist Party candi-
dates the right to run for Congress if such a denial is deemed to establish
additional qualifications for Congressional office, there seems to be substantial
basis for congressional action denying Communists the right to appear on the
ballot for state offices and for presidential electors, despite many statements
that state power in this field is exclusive. 183 Therefore, section 3 may best be
construed to keep Communist candidates off the ballot only for state offices and
presidential electors. If it is so limited, it will be constitutional when applied.
However, if the courts hold that Congress does not have the power to regulate
the election of either federal or state officers, then section 3 must be struck
down in toto as unconstitutional. 8 4 Since the legislative history clearly indi-
cates that Congress intended to deny Communists some right to appear on the
ballot, 8 5 the courts would be engaging in judicial legislation if they excluded
this deprivation from the scope of section 3 merely to preserve its constitu-
tionality.
DISABILITIES IMPOSED UPON INDIVIDUAL PARTY MEMBERS
In contrast to section 3 of the CCA, which is aimed at the Communist Party
itself, section 4 is specifically directed towards members of the Party and of
similar organizations.18 6 However, as in the case of section 3, neither the
182. It was argued that Congress' power under the common defense and welfare
clause in Article I, § 8, cl. 1 of the Constitution justified federal intrusion into state
elections. Brief for Appellant, p. 17, Salwen v. Rees, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2176 (N.J. Sup.
Ct., Oct. 11, 1954).
183. See note 166 slpra.
184. See note 84 supra.
185. See note 111 and text at note 150 supra.
186. Section 4 provides:
"Whoever knowingly and willfully becomes or remains a member of (1) the Com-
munist Party, or (2) any other organization having for one of its purposes or objectives
the establishment, control, conduct, seizure, or overthrow of the Government of the
United States, or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, by the
use of force or violence, with knowledge of the purpose or objective of such organization
shall be subject to all the provisions and penalties of the Internal Security Act of 1950,
as amended, as a member of a 'Communist-action' organization.
"(b) For the purposes of this section, the term 'Communist Party' means the organiza-
tion now known as the Communist Party of the United States of America, the Coln-
munist Party of any State or subdivision thereof, and any unit or subdivision of any such
organization, whether or not any change is hereafter made in the name thereof."
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language of the statute nor the legislative history clearly indicates what
Congress intended to do.
Meaning and Scope of Section 4
Section 4 provides that those who come within its scope are "subject to all
the provisions and penalties of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended,
as members of a 'Communist-action' organization." The section covers anyone
who "knowingly and willfully becomes or remains a member of (1) the Com-
munist Party, or (2) any other organization having for one of its purposes
or objectives the establishment, control, seizure or overthrow of the Govern-
ment of the United States, or the government of any State or political subdi-
vision thereof, by the use of force or violence, with knowledge of the purpose
or objective of such organization . ...
Before dealing with the problems raised by section 4, the ISA should be
examined to determine which of its "provisions and penalties" apply to mem-
bers of "Communist-action" organizations. 8 7 No obligations or sanctions are
imposed upon such persons until the organization has registered as a "Com-
munist-action" organization or there is in effect a "final order" of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Board requiring it so to register.1 88 At that time the
members are subjected to certain disabilities: they may not apply for or use
passports, 8 9 work in a defense facility, 90 hold any non-elective office or em-
ployment under the United States,'9 ' or obtain or receive certain classified
information. -92 In addition, if a proscribed organization does not register its
members within sixty days after it registers or a "final order" is entered against
it, they can be directed to register by the Attorney General.0 3 If a member
does not register when so ordered, he is subject to heavy penal sanctions.19
And he is liable to additional penalties if he applies for a passport,05 gets work
187. See note 247 infra for definition of "Communist-action" organization.
188. 64 STAT. 991-93 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(c), 784-85 (1952). See also Note, 51
CoLU.. L. REv. 608, 617, 624 (1951).
An order of the SACB does not become "final" until after the "aggrieved party" has
had the opportunity to appeal the Board's order to the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court. 64 STAT. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1952).
189. 64 STAT. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1952).
190. 64 STAT. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1952).
191. Ibid.
192. 64 STAT. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(c) (1952).
193. Under the ISA, 64 STAT. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 787(a) (b) (1952, the
members of a "communist-action" organization are under an obligation to register LO
days after the final order against their organization or after learning a registered organiza-
tion to which they belong has failed to register them. However, no penalty is incurred
by a failure to register until there is a final order of the SACB directing the indhidual
member to register. 64 STAT. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 794(a). See Note, 51 COLuhA. L
Rav 606, 617 n.122 (1951).
194. The statute provides for a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine, with each day of failure to register constituting a serarate Affcnse. (A STr.%.
1002 (19-0), 50 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1952).
195. 64 STAT. 1003 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 794(c) (1952).
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in a defense plant without revealing his membership, 100 or receives classified
information. 97 At present, no order requiring any organization to register as
a "Communist-action" organization has been made final, although the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has upheld the order
of the SACB finding the Communist Party to be a "Communist-action" organi-
zation and ordering it to register.198 This order is not "final" until the Supreme
Court affirms the decision or denies certiorari.100
The most perplexing problem raised by section 4 is how, if at all, it changes
the situation existing under the ISA. Though somewhat contradictory,
the debates on the floor of the Senate at least indicate that a number of
Senators believed that the section did more than merely reenact the ISA."00
What this "more" is, however, is not at all clear. Two possible interpretations
of section 4 emerge from the debates. One maintains that section 4 requires
the members of the Communist Party and other organizations within its scope
to register immediately, rather than sixty days after a final order of the
SACB; and if they fail to register, it empowers the Attorney General to proceed
at once against them before the SACB for an order requiring them to register.
But presumably the other sanctions of the ISA would not be imposed until the
organization registers or there is in effect a final order directing it to do so.
Apparently this was the interpretation given the section by Senators Cooper
and McCarran. 2 01 The other interpretation is that section 4 immediately
subjects the members of the Communist Party and other organizations with-
in its compass to the disabilities imposed by the ISA upon members of "Coni-
munist-action" organizations except for the registration requirement. This
apparently was the view adopted by Senators Butler and Morse.20 2 Although
both Senators McCarran and Butler were members of the conference committee
196. Ibid.
197. 64 STAT. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(d) (1952).
198. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11850, D.C.
Cir., Dec. 23, 1954.
199. See note 188 mipra.
200. It is difficult to believe that Congress would include a section in the statute
which it felt had no function whatsoever. Although Senator McCarran said once in the
course of the debates that § 4 "reenacted" the ISA, 100 Cong. Rec. 14403 (daily ed.
Aug. 19, 1954), he and other Senators at other times indicated that it did something more.
See notes 201-02 infra and accompanying text. Senators Humphrey and Butler made it
clear that they felt the new bill would "expedite action under the Internal Security Act"
and "supplement, implement, and strengthen the whole body of law directed at the
communist conspiracy in America." 100 Cong. Rec. 14394 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954).
201. When asked by Senator Cooper whether "the only substantial difference between
the Internal Security Act and [section 4 of the CCA] . . . is that, whereas it is necessary
for a demand to be made on the communist-front [action?] organization to register its
members and its failure to do so before an individual member can be required to register,
under the Internal Security Act an individual member could be directed to register im-
mediately under [section 4] ?," Senator McCarran answered in the affirmative. 100 Cong.
Rec. 14403 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954).
202. In discussing § 4, Sen. Butler said: "[Miere membership in the Communist Party
will not be a crime. A person must knowingly and willingly be a member of the Communist
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which drafted section 4 in its present form,2 0 3 the statements of Senator Butler
are probably entitled to greater weight. His views on section 4 were expounded
in a series of extensive statements2 0°4 whereas Senator McCarran's interpretation
of the section was expressed in a short answer to a single question. -1° Also, when
Senator Morse later repeated Senator Butler's remarks as being his under-
standing of what section 4 accomplished, no one corrected or questioned him.'06
Therefore, on the basis of the best part of a confused legislative history, it appears
that section 4 differs from the ISA only to the extent that section 4 hmncdiatdy
subjects members of the Communist Party and the other organizations coming
within its scope to the disabilities, other than registration, imposed by the ISA.
Party. He has got to know what it is and join it willingly. When he dues that, lie bLCUmeW,
a member, within the meaning and intent of the Internal Security Act of 1950, of a Com-
munist-action organization. Whcn hc takes that step lie becomes subject to the sanctions of
the Internal Security Act, which I shall place in the Record ....
"The provisions are: [Sen. Butler then listed the sanctions imposed upvnu members of
"Communist-action" organizations by the ISA: They cannot hold jobs in the Guernnent
or in defense facilities, and if they apply for such jobs, they must disclose their mcmbr!,hip.
Also, they may not knowingly receive certain classified information. Althuugh it %a, nut
listed by Sen. Butler, the new prohibition against holding office or emply ncut in lahbir
organizations, directed against members of "Conununist-action" organizations under the
ISA, as amended by § 6 of the CCA, should also be included among thuse sanctions
imposed upon Communist Party members by § 4 of the CCA.]
"The members of a Communist-action organization must also, under certain eircum-
stances, register with the Attorney General as a member of such organization." 10 Cong.
Rec. 14392 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954) (emphasis added). Sen. Humphrey in effect repeated
the above statement as -his understanding of § 4. Id at 14407.
In an exchange with Sen. Kefauver, Sen. Butler again indicated that the provisions
and penalties are immediately applicable to members of the Party:
Sen. Kefauver. "Suppose a young man named John Smith, 21 years of age, and in college,
decides he is a Communist, and suppose ... he even joins the Communist Party."
Sen. Butler. "Knowing and willfully?"
Sen. Kefauver. "Well, he merely knew he joined the Communist Party."
Sen. Butler. "But it is assumed that he did so knowingly and willfully?"
Sen. Kefauver. "Knowingly, let us say."
Sen. Butler. "If his action was kmowing and willful action, lie inunediately comes within
the toils of the law, because that is what the act is aimed at." Id. at 14393 (emphasis added).
Senators Butler and Humphrey stated that "under certain circumstances" the members
of the Communist Party must register. Although these circumstances were not specified,
the debates indicate that at least Sen. Butler felt them to be those set out in the ISA, that
is, no registration of Party members could be compelled until sixty days after a final
order requiring the Party to register. In explaining § 4 to Sen. Kefauver, Sen. Butler
stated: "If the organization of which he is a member, the Communist Party of the
United States, is found by the courts to be a Communist-action organization, then that
organization of which he is a member would have to register, and his name would have
to be on the roster of members of that organization. If the organization did not register,
then he would have to register and he would have to do nothing else." Ibid. (emphasis
added).
203. See report of conference committee, 100 Cong. Rec. 14390-91 (daily ed. Aug. 19,
1954).
204. See note 202 stpra.
205. See note 201. supra.
206. 100 Cong. Rec. 14407 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954).
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Even after there is a "final order" requiring the Communist Party to
register under the ISA, section 4 will still have some utility. It is true that
after a "final order" the disabilities of the ISA will be imposed on Party
members by virtue of the ISA without any assistance from section 4. -0o7 How-
ever, this section covers other subversive organizations 208 and hence will
expedite action against them by immediately subjecting their members to the
"provisions and penalties" of the ISA, even though there are no final orders
in effect against the organizations. Moreover, section 4 may prevent circum-
vention of the ISA by Communist Party members who seek to avoid the effect
of a "final order" by resigning from the Party and joining a similar organiza-
tion with a different name. Under the ISA, the Attorney General might have
to go through another long process of litigation before the SACB and the
courts to get a "final order" requiring the new organization to register. Under
section 4, however, the new organization would probably be included within
the broad definition of the Communist Party as "any unit or subdivision of...
such organization, whether or not any change is hereafter made in the name
thereof."209
Constitutional Problems Raised by Section 4
Section 4 raises few constitutional questions that are not also raised by the
ISA.210 The same sanctions and provisions are involved, the only difference
being that some of the sanctions are imposed immediately rather than after
a "final order." The First Amendment problems posed by the ISA sanctions
were considered by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board.2 11 There the court,
applying both the clear and present danger test and the Douds balancing of
interests standard, held that the ISA does not infringe First Amendment
rights.212 It is likely that any First Amendment objections to section 4 will
receive the same answer. The Communist Party case also decided that the ISA
is not a bill of attainder.213 Although this problem is somewhat greater tinder
section 4 because of its specification of the Communist Party, the retrospective
207. See notes 188-93 supra and accompanying text.
208. See CCA § 4(a) (2), quoted in note 186supra.
209. CCA§4(b).
This will be of great assistance to the Attorney General. It has taken more than four
years to get as far as the Supreme Court in the attempt to get the Communist Party to
register as a "Communist-action" organization. See remarks of Sen. Lehman, 100 Cong.
Rec. 14079 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954).
210. For a discussion of the constitutional problems raised by the ISA, see Suther-
land, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. RZv. 383 (1951); Comments, 39 Gm.
L.J. 440 (1951); 46 i1.. L. Rxv. 274 (1951); 25 ST. Jon's L. Rzv. 397 (1951); Notes,
51 COLUM. L. Ray. 606 (1951); 31 Nmx. L. Rav. 429 (1952).
211. Civil No. 11850, D.C. Cir., Dec. 23, 1954.
212. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11850, D.C.
Cir., Dec. 23, 1954, pp. 10-16.
213. Id. at 40.
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effect requirement of the Douds case 2 14 probably rules out the possibility of
invalidating the section as a bill of attainder, since it applies only to one who
"willfully becomes or remains a member" of the proscribed organization.
DETERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP
Section 5 of the CCA lists thirteen criteria 215 which, if evidence concerning
them is presented, the court is supposed to instruct the jury to consider in
determining: (1) membership or participation in the Communist Party; (2)
membership or participation in any other organization defined in the Act; and
(3) knowledge of the purpose or objective of the Communist Party or of any
other organization defined in the Act. For example, the jury is to take into
account whether an individual has made financial contributions to the organi-
zation, has made himself subject to its discipline, or has executed its orders,
214. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
215. "Section 5. In determining membership or participation in the Communist Party
or any other organization defined in this Act, or knowledge of the purpose or objective
of such party or organization, the jury, under instructions from the court, shall consider
evidence, if presented, as to whether the accused person:
"(1) Has been listed to his knowledge as a member in any book or any of the lists,
records, correspondence, or any other document of the organization;
"(2) Has made financial contribution to the organization in dues, assessments, Loans,
or in any other form;
"(3) Has made himself subject to the discipline of the organization in any form what-
soever;
"(4) Has executed orders, plans, or directives of any kind of the organization;
"(5) Has acted as an agent, courier, messenger, correspondent, organizer, or in any
other capacity in behalf of the organization;
"(6) Has conferred with officers or other members of the organization in behalf of
any plan or enterprise of the organization;
"(7) Has been accepted to his knowledge as an officer or member of the organization
or as one to be called upon for services by other officers or members of the organization;
"(8) Has written, spoken or in any other way communicated by signal, semaphore,
sign, or in any other form of communication orders, directives, or plans of the organi-
zation;
"(9) Has prepared documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of pub-
lication in behalf of the objectives and purposes of the organization;
"(10) Has mailed, shipped, circulated, distributed, delivered, or in any other way sent
or delivered to others material or propaganda of any kind in behalf of the organization;
"(11) Has advised, counseled or in any other way imparted information, suggestions,
recommendations to officers or members of the organization, or to anyone else in behalf
of the objectives of the organization;
"(12) Has indicated by word, action, conduct, writing or in any other wvay a willing-
ness to carry out in any manner and to any degree the plans, designs, objectives, or pur-
poses of the organization;
"(13) Has in any other way participated in the activities, planning, actions, objectives,
or purposes of the organization;
"(14) The enumeration of the above subjects of evidence on membership or partici-
pation in the Communist Party or any other organization as above defined, shall not limit
the inquiry into and consideration of any other subject of evidence on membership and
participation as herein stated."
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plans, or directives. 216 The jury's findings of knowledge and membership
or participation are important in determining the application of section 4 of
the Act.2
1 7
An initial problem raised by section 5 is the effect to be given these criteria.
During the limited debate on the section, there was one suggestion that it
establishes a definition of membership in the Communist Party or other pro-
scribed groups.2 1 8  This view, however, cannot be given much credence.
Senator Humphrey, who introduced the section. regarded it as merely estab-
lishing rules "by which the court can hear evidence" and instruct the jury.-""'
Nor does the section's wording indicate that Congress intended to set up strict
definitions of membership or knowledge. 22 0 Furthermore, the obvious due pro-
cess objections which would be presented if the vague criteria of section 5 were
construed as definitions militate against such an interpretation.2 2 1
Any argument that a conclusive presumption of membership or knowledge
should be raised by proof of the section 5 factors must also be rejected.
Nothing in the section or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended
section 5 to have this effect. Moreover, it seems clear that such a conclusive
presumption would be held to be an unconstitutional impingement on the
judicial function and a deprivation of due process.222
Although less serious constitutional problems are created by giving the
216. See note 215 supra.
217. Knowing and willing members of the Communist Party and certain other organi-
zations are "subject to all the provisions and penalties of the Internal Security Act of
1950, as amended, as members of a 'Communist-action' organization." Thus, for example,
when an individual applies for a job in a defense facility without disclosing his member-
ship in the Party, he would be indicted for violating § 5 of the ISA, 64 8TAT. 992
(1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784 (1952), and the criteria in § 5 of the CCA would be used at this
trial to determine the defendant's membership in the Party and his knowledge of its pur-
poses or objectives. 100 Cong. Rec. 14392 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1954) (remarks of Sen.
Butler).
218. See remarks of Reps. Dies and Feiglan, 100 Cong. Rec. 14041 (daily ed. Aug.
17,1954).
219. Sen. Humphrey said: "The purpose of the new section ... is to establish certain
criteria by which the court can hear evidence so as to determine effective member-
ship .... 100 Cong. Rec. 14091 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954).
220. Section 5 refers to the criteria as "subjects of evidence." See note 215 supra.
221. For a discussion of the due process requirement of definiteness in statutes, see
Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 77 (1948).
222. The legislature may make a conclusive rule of evidence only if it could constitu-
tionally attach to the facts giving rise to the presumption the same legal consequences
which flow from the fact presumed. Otherwise it is void as violative of due process and
an unwarranted infringement upon the judiciary. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1353 (3d ed.
1940). For cases in which conclusive presumptions have been invalidated, see Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1931) (statute by which gifts made within a given number of
years before death were conclusively presumed to have been made in contemplation of
death); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1925) (same); cf. Commissioner v.
Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953) (Clifford Regulations taxing income of trusts to
settlor if they were to last for less than ten years).
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effect of a rebuttable presumption to proof of the section 5 criteria, this inter-
pretation is not supported by either the section's language or its legislative
history. If the courts nevertheless adopt this interpretation, section 5's con-
stitutionality will depend on the reasonableness of the connection between the
facts presumed (membership and knowledge) and the facts proved (the thir-
teen criteria). 2 -3 The courts would have to apply this test to each of the
criteria, striking out any that do not qualify.
The most acceptable view is that section 5 was intended merely to establish
a rule for the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the criteria and to require
the court to instruct the jury to consider this evidence.2- 4 Such an interpreta-
tion is most in accord with the section's wording 2 !5 and with what can be
gleaned from the meager legislative history.220 Under this construction, section
5 has little legal significance. Evidence as to the items listed would probably
be admissible as relevant without benefit of the section.22- Moreover, federal
judges have long had the right to make fair comment to the jury on the evi-
223. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) ; McFarland v. American Sugar Re-
fining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1915); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913); 'Mobile, J. &
K.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910); Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S.E 540
(1914).
224. The legislature can change rules of evidence. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 584,
599 (1904); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1892); 1 Wio;o.'ac,
EvDENCE § 7 (3d ed. 1940).
In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11830, D.C.
Cir., Dec. 23, 1954, p. 40, the court treated as merely "evidentiary considerations" the
eight criteria found in § 13 (e) of the ISA, which were designed to be used in determining
whether an organization is a "Communist-action!' organization. The court specifically re-
jected the suggestion of the Party that § 13(e) creates a presumption. Id. at 43.
In United States v. Silverman, 23 U.S.L. WE.ir 2439 (D. Corn. Feb. 23, 1955), in-
volving prosecution of second string Communist Party, leaders under the Smith Act, the
defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the broad criteria in § 5 of
the CCA would make their defense difficult, if not impossible, since witnesses and lawyers
would hesitate to aid them for fear of later being punished as members of the Communist
Party. The court rejected this argument although it granted the motion to dismiss on
another ground. The court said that the CCA did not impose sanctiuns upon persuns who
ceased to be members of the Communist Party before the Act was passed; consequently,
these persons need not fear aiding the defendants in preparing their defense, since the
criteria in § 5 can only be used to show membership in the Party after the effcctive date
of the CCA. If a witness or other person aiding in the defense was a member of the
Party after the passage of the CCA, the court said that the defendants' difficulties were
no different from those of other defendants who seek to get criminals to testify and are
unsuccessful because the witness fears he himself will be apprehended. The court's reas,.n-
ing is sound, especially in view of the fact that the criteria in § 5 merely create rules fur
the admissibility of evidence, and most, if not all, of the facts coming within the criteria
in § 5 would be admissible as relevant evidence without the aid of the section. See note
227 infra and accompanying text.
225. See note 215 supra.
226. See note 219 supra.
227. For general rules of relevancy of evidence, see, e.g., 1 Wn;GMoRu, EVIDENCE §§ 24-
36 (3d ed. 1940).
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dence ;228 thus section 5 seems simply to impose a duty to do something which
was previously discretionary.
A second question raised by section 5 is whether it applies to prosecutions
and proceedings under statutes other than the CCA. 229 The section is not by
its terms limited to prosecutions under the CCA.23 0 Because of the intimate
relation between section 4 of the CCA and the ISA, section 5 presumably
applies to those proceedings under the ISA in which a jury must determine
whether an individual is a member of the Communist Party or other pro-
scribed organization mentioned in the CCA, or whether he had knowledge of
its objectives. 231 In determining whether section 5 applies to statutes other
than the CCA and ISA, the legislative history is of little help. If section 5 is
interpreted as merely requiring the courts to admit certain kinds of evidence
and instruct the jury to consider the evidence presented, it would not make
much difference if it were given general application. But if the section is
construed as creating a rebuttable presumption, the courts might be somewhat
reluctant to apply it outside the CCA and ISA.
AMENDMENT OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
The second half of the CCA, made up of sections 6 to 11, directly amends the
ISA of 1950. Most of these sections constitute what was originally the Butler
bill.2
32
Mis1cellaneous Amendments of the ISA
Two of the CCA amendments are relatively simple, and the constitutional
problems which they pose are related to those already raised by the ISA.
Therefore, they will be but briefly discussed here.
228. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933) ; Rucker v. Wheeler, 127 U.S. 85
(1888) ; Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1946) ; WImInTAN, FEDutAL
CRIMINAL PRocEmuRE § 30.6 (1950).
229. The question of membership in the Communist Party may be presented to a
jury in a variety of instances:
1. Prosecutions under the ISA and § 4 of the CCA for applying for a passport; work-
ing in a defense facility or in a government job; receiving certain classified information;
holding office or employment with a labor organization (added by § 6 of the CCA; see
text at note 233 infra) ; or failing to register when required by the ISA.
2. Prosecutions under the Smith Act, 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
In a number of other instances, the question of membership in the Party must be con-
sidered by administrative agencies and the courts without a jury.
1. Naturalization proceedings, 66 STAT. 240 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (1952).
2. Proceedings to revoke naturalization, 66 STAT. 261 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c)
(1952).
3. Proceedings to exclude, 66 STAT. 184 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1952), or deport,
66 STAT. 205 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1952), aliens.
4. Proceedings before the SACB to determine if an organization is "Communist-in-
filtrated." Section 13A(e) of the ISA (added by § 10 of the CCA).
230. See note 215 supra.
231. See note 229 supra.
232. Section 6 was part of the original Humphrey bill. 100 Cong. Rec. 13557 (daily
ed. Aug. 12,1954).
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The first of these amendments is found in section 6, which imposes a new
employment disability on members of "Communist-action" and "Communist-
front" organizations. This section makes it unlawful for them "to hold any
office or employment with any labor organization as that term is defined in
section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended .... or to
represent any employer in any matter or proceeding arising or pending under
that Act. '233 Violators of this provision are subject to severe penalties.Y
The seriousness of the constitutional problems raised by section 6 will de-
pend upon whether its broadly worded provisions are held to apply only to
unions whose activities affect interstate commerce. This limitation would
render the section valid under the Supreme Court's rationale in the Douds
case, which gave Congress wide latitude to control communists in labor unions
under its authority to prevent obstructions to the free flow of interstate
commerce.2 5 Such a restriction is not contained in the words of the section,
since the definition of labor organizations which the section incorporates from
the NLRA is not confined to organizations representing employees in indus-
tries affecting interstate commerce.2 30 However, the limitation probably
represents congressional intent, since it is likely that Congress wvas thinking
in terms of the Taft-Hartley non-communist oath, which is required only of
leaders of unions whose activities affect interstate commerce.P T Moreover,
in the absence of this restriction it might be more difficult to show that section
6 effectuates a legitimate congressional purpose. The ISA's control over pri-
vate employment is limited to defense facilities, and hence is dearly valid as
an exercise of the power to preserve the national safety.Ys To justify section 6
on the same grounds, it would have to be denmonstrated that a threat to national
security may arise from communist infiltration of labor unions whose activities
do not affect interstate commerce.
233. This section 6 amendment constitutes a new subsection of § 5 (a) (1) of the ISA.
64 STAT. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1) (1952).
234. The statute provides for a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine. 64 STAT. 1003 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 794(c) (1952).
235. In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), the Court
upheld the requirement that union officers take a non-Communist oath as a prerequisite to
the union's right to use the facilities of the NLRB. The Court held this was a valid
exercise of Congress' power to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce by political
strikes. Id. at 387-93.
236. The labor organizations referred to in § 6 are those defined in § 2(5) of the
NLRA, as amended. See text at note 233 .supra. This definition provides: "The term 'labor
organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose ...
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work" 61 STAT. 137 (1947), -9 U.S.C. § 152 (19-52).
237. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952).
238. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil ,No. 11SWO, D.C.
Cir., Dec. 23, 1954, p. 34.
239. For the ISA provisions, see 64 STAT. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784(c) (1952)
(employment) ; 64 STAT. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785(c) (1952) (passport).
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A second amendment of the ISA was effectuated by section 7(c) of the
CCA. This repealed certain ISA provisions which had suspended imposition
of employment and passport sanctions on individuals who sought to correct
erroneous listings of their names in the registration statement of a communist
organization. 239 Previously, when an individual brought proceedings to rectify
an incorrect listing, he could postpone for six months public notice of the fact
that his name was listed ;240 during that period, the passport and employment
sanctions were not effective.241 Under the section 7(c) amendment, publica-
tion of the complainant's name is still delayed,2'2 but the sanctions become
effective immediately. This provision has recently been upheld by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.243
The Communist-Infiltrated Organization
The CCA broadens the scope of the ISA by amending it to include another
type of "communist organization," the "Communist-infiltrated" organization.2 a'
The amendments define the new classification and establish the consequences
which flow from a determination that an organization meets this definition.
Definition of a "Communist-Infiltrated" Organization
Section 7(a) 24 5 of the CCA provides that a group must have two character-
istics to constitute a "Communist-infiltrated" organization. First, it must be
an organization, other than a "Communist-action" or "Communist-front"
240. 64 STAT. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 788(b) (1952).
241. See note 239 supra.
242. Section 7(c) did not repeal any part of 64 STAT. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 788(b)
(1952).
243. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Civil No. 11850, D.C.
Cir., Dec. 23, 1954, p. 30 n.48.
244. This extension of the ISA was thought necessary because of the ineffectiveness
of the Taft-Hartley affidavit requirement in getting communists out of positions of union
leadership. H.R. REP. No. 2651, pt. 1, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1954). See also Shair,
How Effective Is The Non-Communist Affidavit?, 1 LAB. L.J. 935 (1950). Also, it was
felt that unions could not be included within the ISA definition of "communist-action" or
"communist-front" organizations. S. Rz'. No. 1709, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954) ; remarks
by Sen. Butler, 100 Cong. Rec. 13411 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1954).
245. Section 7(a) adds a new subsection to § 3 of the ISA, the definition section, 64
STAT. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782. It provides:
"Sec. 7. (a) Section 3 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
782) is amended by inserting, immediately after paragraph (4) thereof, the following new
paragraph:
"(4A) The term 'Communist-infiltrated organization' means any organization in the
United States (other than a Communist-action organization or a Communist-front organi-
zation) which (A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by an individual or
individuals who are, or who within three years have been actively engaged in, giving aid
or support to a Communist-action organization, a Communist foreign government, or the
world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and (B) is serving, or
within three years has served, as a means for (i) the giving of aid or support to any such
organization, government, or movement, or (ii) the impairment of the military strength
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organization, which is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by an
individual or individuals who are, or within the past three years have been,
actively engaged in giving aid or support to a "Communist-action" organiza-
tion, a Communist foreign government, or the world Communist movement.
Secondly, the organization must be serving, or within three years have served,
as a means for giving aid or support to a "Communist-action" organization, a
communist foreign government, or to the world communist movement, or as
a means for the impairment of the military strength of the United States or
its industrial capacity to furnish logistical or other military support required
by the Armed Forces.246
of the United States or its industrial capacity to furnish logistical or other material suppurt
required by its Armed Forces: Providcd, however, that any labor organization which is an
affiliate in good standing of a national federation or other labor organization whose policies
and activities have been directed to opposing Communist organizations, any Communist
foreign government, or the world Communist movement, shall be presumed prima fade
not to be a 'Communist-infiltrated organization'."
By § 7(b) of the CCA, subsection 5 of § 3 of the ISA is amended to include "Com-
munist-infiltrated" organizations along with "communist-action" and "communist-front"
organizations in the definition of "communist organizations."
246. Section 10 of the CCA added § 13A to the ISA. In § 13A(e) are seven criteria
to be used by the SACB in determining whether an organization is "Communist-infiltrated."
Section 13A(e) provides:
"(e) In determining whether any organization is a Communist-infiltrated organiza-
tion, the Board shall consider-
"(1) to what extent, if any, the effective management of the affairs of such organi-
zation is conducted by one or more individuals who are, or vithin two years have been,
(A) members, agents, or representatives of any Communist organization, and Communist
foreign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this
title, with knowledge of the nature and purpose thereof, or (B) engaged in giving aid or
support to any such organization, government, or movement with Imowledge of the nature
and purpose thereof;
"(2) to what extent, if any, the policies of such organization are, or within three years
have been, formulated and carried out pursuant to the direction or advice of any member,
agent, or representative of any such organization, government, or movement;
"(3) to what extent, if any, the personnel and resources of such organization are, or
within three years have been, used to further or promote the objectives of any such Com-
munist organization, government, or movement;
"(4) to what extent, if any, such organization within three years has received from,
or furnished to or for the use of, any such Communist organization, government, or move-
ment any funds or other material assistance;
"(5) to what extent, if any, such organization is, or within three years has been,
affiliated in any way with any such Communist organization, government, or movement;
"(6) to what extent, if any, the affiliation of such organization, or of any individual
or individuals who are members thereof or who manage its affairs, hvith any such Com-
munist organization, government, or movement is concealed from or is not disclosed to the
membership of such organization; and
"(7) to what extent, if any, such organization or any of its members or managers are,
or within three years have been, cnowingly engaged-
"(A) in any conduct punishable under section 4 or 15 of this Act or under chapter
37, 105, or 115 of title 1S of the United States Code; or
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The vagueness of the section 7(a) definition raises serious doubts as to the
constitutionality of the provisions directed against "Communist-infiltrated"
organizations. That definition is not as explicit as the ISA definitions of
"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations, 247 which are more
readily capable of proof or disproof.2 48 The generalities contained in the sec-
tion 7(a) definition might encompass innocent and patriotic groups. Terms
such as "serving ... as a means for the giving of support," or "means for...
the impairment of the military strength of the United States or its industrial
capacity," vest extremely broad discretion in the Attorney General, who in-
itiates the proceedings, and the SACB, which makes the findings. The lan-
guage, for example, affords opportunity to disrupt a legitimate strike or ruin
an innocent union.249 It is true that statutes imposing penal sanctions will be
struck down as void for vagueness more readily than civil statutes.2 5 0 And
"(B) with intent to impair the military strength of the United States or its indus-
trial capacity to furnish logistical or other support required by its armed forces, in
any activity resulting in or contributing to any such impairment."
These criteria are not a substitute for the definition in CCA § 7 and it is that definition
that must be satisfied. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
Civil No. 11850, D.C. Cir., Dec. 23, 1954, pp. 40-45 (discussion of similar criteria to be
considered by the SACB in determining if an organization is a "Communist-action" or-
ganization) ; Note, 51 COLUmJ. L. REV. 606, 616 n.107 (1951) (same).
247. "Communist-action" organization is defined as:
"any organization in the United States (other than a diplomatic representative or mission
of a foreign government accredited as such by the Department of State) which (i) is
substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this
title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist move-
ment as referred to in said section." 64 STAT. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782(3) (1952).
"Communist-front" organization is defined as:
"any organization in the United States (other than a Communist-action organization as
defined in paragraph 3 of this section) which (A) is substantially directed, dominated, or
controlled by a Communist-action organization, and (B) is primarily operated for the
purpose of giving aid and support to a Communist-action organization, a Communist for-
eign government, or the world Communist movement referred to in section 781 of this
title." 64 STAT. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782(4) (1952).
248. See Note, 51 CoLu-m. L. REv. 606, 615 (1951).
249. One of the major complaints of those who opposed the Butler bill was that the
vagueness of the definition and the great discretion given to the Attorney General made
§ 7(a) a potentially dangerous anti-labor weapon that could be used to break a legitimate
strike and ruin unions in no way connected with the communist movement. H.R. REi'. No.
2651, pt. 2, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1954) (minority report) ; see remarks by Sen. Lehman,
100 Cong. Rec. 13416-17 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1954), and Sen. Morse, id. at 13461.
As an alternative, Sen. Morse proposed that communist domination of unions be made
an unfair labor practice, thereby placing the whole matter under the jurisdiction of the
NLRB rather than the Justice Department. Id. at 13462-63. Sen. Lehman, on the other
hand, felt that the unions were doing a good enough job on their own in cleaning com-
munists out of the labor movement and urged a "hands-off" policy. Id. at 13416-17. All
of the major labor unions opposed the Butler bill. H.R. REP. No. 2651, pt. 2, supra, at 3.
250. See Notes, 62 HARV. L. REV. 77, 85 (1948) ; 45 HARV. L. REv. 160 n.1 (1931).
The Supreme Court has held that civil statutes too can be unconstitutionally vague.
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although the sanctions imposed by the CCA upon "Communist-infiltrated"
organizations are serious, they do not appear to constitute criminal penalties. - 1
Nevertheless, because of the gravity of the deprivations, the courts should
require Congress to formulate a definition which would enable organizations
to guide their future conduct and which would provide an objective test by
which the SACB and the courts could reach consistent results.252
The Section 7(a) Proviso
To meet the argument that the vague language of section 7(a) could
endanger loyal and patriotic unions, a proviso was added.25 3 This created a
printa fade presumption that "any labor organization which is an affiliate in
good standing 254 of a national federation 255 or other labor organization =6
whose policies and activities have been directed to opposing Communist organi-
zations, any Communist foreign government, or the world Communist move-
ment" is not a "Communist-infiltrated" organization.2 T It is difficult to see
See A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925) (holding un-
constitutional a statute which would have invalidated a contract, leaving the parties to
their remedy in quantum wendt).
251. A labor union found to be a "Communist-infiltrated" organization is denied all
the benefits granted by the NLRA. See text at notes 270-79 infra. And any organization
categorized as "Communist-infiltrated" is denied certain favorable tax treatment, see note
267 infra, and is required to label its mail and radio broadcasts as "distributed by" or
"sponsored by" a communist organization. See note 268 infra. Although these disabilities
may be important to the organization, they do not appear to constitute criminal sanctions,
since the first two merely withdraw benefits granted by statute and the last simply provides
a means tor informing the public as to the nature of the organization distributing literature
or making broadcasts.
252. See Notes, 62 HLv. L. R.v. 77, 85-86 (1948) ; 45 H1Az. L RFv. 160, 163 (1931).
253. For text of proviso, see note 245 stpra. The proviso was proposed by Sen. Ives,
100 Cong. Rec. 13549 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954).
254. The "in good standing" language refers to the standing of labor unions with
their national federation with respect to "subversion and communism and nothing else."
Remarks by Sen. Ives, the sponsor of the proviso, 100 Cong. Rec. 13552 (daily ed. Aug.
12, 1954). The unions which have been expelled from the CIO because of their communist
leaders were said not to be entitled to take advantage of the prima fade presumption
created by the proviso. Id. at 13554-55 (remarks by Sen. Ives). But it is not necessary
that a union be expelled from the National Federation in order for it to be deemed not in
"good standing," id. at 13552.
255. The CIO, AFL, UM.V, and the Railroad Brotherhoods were given as examples
of "a national federation." 100 Cong. Rec. 13549 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954) (remarks of
Sens. Ives and Morse).
256. "[O]r other labor organizations" was added so as not to limit the proviso solely
to the large federation. Thus, small independent unions with a history of anti-communism
could take advantage of the proviso. 100 Cong. Rec. 13553-55 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954)
(statements by Sens. Holland, Ives, Smith, and Butler).
257. This proviso was said to give unions a chance to "clean house" themselves, thus
making the rooting out of communists from unions a cooperative enterprise between the
unions and the government. 100 Cong. Rec. 13553 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954) (remarks by
Sens. Morse, Ives, and Butler).
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how this proviso improves the position of those unions which may take
advantage of it. Under the statutory procedure set up by the ISA and adopted
by the CCA,25s the Attorney General has the burden of proof in establishing
that an organization is "Communist-infiltrated. ' '25D Thus, unless the "pre-
sumption of innocence," as the proviso was labelled,2 0 0 imposes by negative
implication a presumption of guilt upon unions which do not qualify under it,
the proviso in section 7(a) seems to bring about no substantial change. -0 ' And
it is clear from the legislative history that the proviso was not intended to
create such a presumption of guilt.2 2 Therefore, the proviso gives innocent
unions no additional protection against the dangers inherent in the vague section
7 definition.263
258. Section 13A(d) of the ISA (added by § 10 of the CCA) adopts the procedure of
88 13(c), (d) of the ISA, 64 STAT. 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 792(c), (d) (1952), for
proceedings before the SACB to determine if an organization is communist-infiltrated.
Also, § 11 of the CCA amends § 14 of the ISA, 64 STAT. 1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 793
(1952), so that the orders of the SACB concerning "Communist-infiltrated" organizations
may be appealed to the courts and may be set aside if not "supported by the preponderance
of the evidence." See Note, 51 COLum. L. REv. 606, 622-23 (1951).
259. Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1006(c) (1952), which governs the procedure to be followed by federal administrative
tribunals, states: "Except as statutes otherwise provide, the proponents of a rule or order
shall have the burden of proof." This section is regarded as imposing upon the proponent
not only the burden of proof but also the burden of going forward with the evidence. See
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 468 (1951). The Administrative Procedure Act is applicable
in proceedings under the ISA, 64 STAT. 1003 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 795 (1952). Thus, since
nothing is said in the ISA concerning burdens of proof, if the Attorney General seeks to
obtain an order from the SACB that a union is "Communist-infiltrated," he has both the
burden of going forward with the evidence and the ultimate burden of proof.
260. Statement by Sen. Ives, 100 Cong. Rec. 13554 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954).
261. A prima facie presumption in favor of the union would probably place upon the
Attorney General only the burden of going forward with the evidence, although it might
also be regarded as also imposing upon him the ultimate burden of proof. In any event,
the legislative history clearly shows that the presumption was intended to be rebuttable.
See remarks of Sens. Cooper, Ives, and Ferguson, 100 Cong. Rec. 13551-52 (daily ed. Aug.
12, 1954). However, even without this presumption, the Attorney General had both the
burden of proof and of going forward with the evidence. See note 259 sispra.
262. The purpose of the proviso was not to worsen the situation of unions with leaders
of questionable patriotism, but to better the position of loyal and patriotic unions. The
debates indicate that no presumption of guilt was intended. Sen. Cordon asked Sen. lves,
"Are we saying certain groups are presumed not to be Communist-dominated, and there-
fore other groups are presumed to be Communist-dominated?" Sen. Ives answered "No;
that is not the intent or purpose of it at all." 100 Cong. Rec. 13555 (daily ed. Aug. 12,
1954).
263. That the proviso did little to ameliorate the anti-labor potentialities inherent in
the § 7(a) definition seems to have been recognized by Sen. Lehman. Even after the
proviso was adopted, he again attacked the Butler bill as having within it the seeds of
destruction for loyal, non-communist labor unions. See remarks by Sen. Lehman, 100
Cong. Rec. 14078-79, 14095-96 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954).
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Consequences Arising fram a Final Deterninalion That an Organ iation Is
a "Conamunist-Infiltratcd" Organization
Consequences to Individual Members of the Organi.ation
The only direct consequence to members of an organization which has
been finally adjudged to be "Conmunist-infiltrated" is that they may not with-
out special authorization knowingly receive classified information from officers
or employees of the United States.2 G4 Unlike members of "Communist-actiun"
or "Communist-front" organizations, the members of "Communist-infiltrated"
groups are not subject to the employment or passport disabilities of the
ISA ;265 nor do they have to register with the Attorney General as do members
of "Communist-action" organizations. 0 However, a determination that an
organization is "Communist-infiltrated" has serious indirect effects upon its
individual members because of the consequences to their organization.
Consequences to the Organization
Although the CCA denies all "Communist-infiltrated" organizations tax
advantages 2 67 and requires them to label their mail and radio and television
broadcasts as "distributed by" or "sponsored by" a communist organization,2G"
the most important sanctions imposed on such organizations are directed only
against those which are labor unions.2 09 Under section 10 of the CCA, upon
264. Section 4(c) of the ISA, 64 STAT. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(c) (1952), which
imposes this disability is applicable to "any Communist organization." And the CCA has
amended the ISA to include a "Communist-infiltrated" organization within the definitihn
of "communist organization." See note 245 supra. Also see H.R. REP. No. 2651, pt. 1,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1954).
265. The sections of the ISA imposing the passport and employment disabilities, 6r4
STAT. 992-93 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 784(a), 785(a) (1952), only apply to members of a
"Communist organization ' when such organization "is registered or there is in effect a
final order of the Board requiring such organization to register." Although a "Communist-
infiltrated" organization is a "communist-organization," see note 245 sutra, it cannot be
made to register. See note 271 infra. Therefore, the ISA provisions imposing passport
and employment disabilities wil not be applicable to members of "Communist-infiltrated"
organizations. See also H.R. REP. No. 2651, pt. 1, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1954).
266. Under the ISA, 64 STAT. 995, 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 787, 794 (1952), unly
members of "Communist-action" organizations must register.
267. Section 8(b) of the CCA amends § 11 of the ISA, 64 ST.T. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§ 790 (1952), to include "Communist-infiltrated" organizations among those denied certain
favorable tax treatment. Contributors are not allowed a deduction fur their contributions,
and the organization is deprived of any exemption to which it might otherwise be entitld
under the federal income tax law.
268. Section 8(a) of the CCA amends § 10 of the ISA, 64 STAT. 93 (1950), 0
U.S.C. § 789 (1952), to include "communist-infiltrated" organizations among those which
must label their mail and broadcasts.
269. Although the provisions in the CCA directed against "Communist-infiltrated"
organizations are applicable to all organizations generally, see definition note 245 supra;
100 Cong. Rec. 13550 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954) (remarks by Sens. Malkne and Ives):
id. at 13834 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954) (remarks by Rep. Keating 1, the nature of the
sanctions imposed upon "communist-infiltrated" organizations clearly indicates that these
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a final order of the SACB determining a labor union to be a "Communist-
action," "Communist-front," or "Communist-infiltrated" organization,21 0 such
union becomes ineligible to: "(1) act as representative of any employee
within the meaning or for the purpose of section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended . . . ; (2) serve as an exclusive representative of
employees of any bargaining unit under section 9 of such Act ... ; (3) make,
or obtain any hearing upon, any charge under section 10 of such Act ... ; or
(4) exercise any other right or privilege, or receive any other benefit, sub-
stantive or procedural, provided by such Act for labor organizations." 2'
It is clear that under these provisions Communist-infiltrated unions are
denied all the benefits derived from the NLRA, but the first clause seems to
impose additional disabilities. Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the
right to act collectively "for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. ' 27 2 If a union is made ineligible to act as a repre-
sentative of employees for all of these purposes, there would seem to be little
left for it to do. However, the Act, correctly interpreted, probably does not
go that far. Its legislative history appears to indicate that Congress intended
merely to deny Communist-infiltrated unions all the benefits granted to them
provisions are primarily directed against unions. See text at notes 272-76 infra, and the
legislative history, H.R. REP. No. 2651, pt. 2, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954) ; 100 Cong.
Rec. 13550 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954) (remarks by Sen. Ives).
Section 13A of the ISA (added by § 10 of the CCA) also provides sanctions for an
employer organization that is found to be "Communist-infiltrated." Under § 13A (g) the
SACB must file a copy of its order concerning an employer organization with the NLRB.
If there is a final order of the SACB determining an employer organization to be "Com-
munist-infiltrated," § 13A(j) makes the employer ineligible to:
"(1) file any petition for an election under section 9 of the National Labor Relations
Act ... or participate in any proceedings under such section; or
"(2) make or obtain any hearing upon any charge under section 10 of such Act... ; or
"(3) exercise any other right or privilege or receive any other benefit, substantive or
procedural, provided by such Act for employers."
These provisions were added to the CCA by an amendment on the floor of the Senate in
order to apply "to employers the same rules which would be applied to labor organiza-
tions." 100 Cong. Rec. 13579 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954). However, it seems unlikely that
these provisions will be used very much, since the major problem giving rise to the
passage of the Butler bill was Communist infiltration into unions rather than into manage-
ment. H.R. REP. No. 2651, pt. 1, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-27 (1954) ; S. REr. No. 1709, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954).
270. Section 11 of the CCA amends § 14(b) of the ISA, 64 STAT. 1002 (1950), 50
U.S.C. § 793(b) (1952), so that an order of the SACB with respect to "Communist-
infiltrated" organizations becomes final in the same way as those pertaining to "Com-
munist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations, that is, after final appeal to the
courts or failure to appeal within the time allowed.
271. However, no "Communist-infiltrated" organization need register with the Attor-
ney General. Under § 7 of the ISA, 64 STAT. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1952), both
"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations must register. In addition,
"Communist-action" organizations must submit a list of their members. The CCA did not
amend the ISA in this area.
272. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
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by the NLRA.2 7 3 This intent is also demonstrated by the absence of sanctions
against Communist-infiltrated unions that continue to act as representatives for
employees for collective bargaining and other purposes.
Even under this relatively limited interpretation, the Act goes somewhat
further than section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act.2-7 4 Under that section,
unions whose officers fail to file non-communist affidavits: (1) cannot seek
any redress for employer unfair labor practices; (2) cannot be certified as
bargaining agents; and (3) cannot have a union shop or maintenance-of-
membership clause in any subsequently negotiated or renewed collective bar-
gaining agreement.27 5 In addition to these deprivations, the CCA denies
Communist-infiltrated unions all other substantive and procedural benefits
that the NLRA grants. Thus, for example, communist-infiltrated unions
cannot take advantage of section 301 of the NLRA, which enables unions
to sue in the federal courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements regard-
less of diversity of citizenship or jurisdictional amount.- 0 However, the union
can presumably continue to serve as the bargaining agent of the employees
if they so desire. But since it is no longer the exclusive representative of all
the employees in the bargaining unit, it can represent only its own members
in any negotiation with the employer. Furthermore, the employer may refuse
to bargain with the Communist-infiltrated union and can instead negotiate
with another group. If it were not for the CCA, the union would presumably
be certified and could petition the NLRB to order the employer to cease and
desist, since refusal to bargain with the certified representative of the em-
273. The House Report states that "the Communist-infiltrated organization is ineligible
under the National Labor Relations Act to act as a labor organization and represent
employees in a bargaining unit." H.R. REP. No. 2651, pt. 1, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954)
(emphasis added). The Senate Report states that "section 13A would deprive any labor
organization, after it has been finally determined to be a Communist-infiltrated organiza-
tion, of its legal standing nder the National Labor Relations Act to act as a labor organi-
zation for the purposes of representing employees in any bargaining unit." S. REP. No.
1709, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954) (emphasis added). In the debates, Rep. Velde stated,
"When a union is finally determined by the Subversive Activities Control Board to be
Communist dominated, it has no rights before the NLRB . . . ." 100 Cong. Rec. 13834
(daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954). And he later stated in a hypothetical, "After proper hearings
if the Subversive Activities Control Board finds in fact that the [Harry] Bridges union
has been infiltrated, it, upon final determination of such finding, would be required to
certify that finding to the National Labor Relations Board and also cause same to be
published in the Federal Register. The National Labor Relations Board would then be
required to deny privileges and benefits of such Communist-infiltrated unions which it
had hitherto enjoyed under the provisions of the National Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, as amended." Id. at 13835.
274. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952).
275. See Kearns, Non-Comuinnst Afflidazits Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 GE,.
L.J. 297 (1949) ; Dayldn, The Operation of the Taft-Hartly Act's Xon-Communnlist Pro-
visions, 36 IOWA L. REv. 607 (1951) ; Comment, IS U. CHT. L RE%. 783 (1951).
276. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952). For the scope of § 301, see Asso-
ciation of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 23 U.S.L.
WEEr 4141 (U.S. March 28, 1955).
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ployees and negotiation with another union constitute unfair labor practices. 277
One thing the CCA does not do is abrogate collective bargaining agreements
existing between the union and the employer, 278 and apparently the union or
the employees may still enforce such agreements in the courts.270 In addition,
if the union has the cooperation and support of its members, it can still call
a strike in order to force the employer to bargain with it or comply with the
agreement.
Although these sanctions against "Communist-infiltrated" unions will not
immediately destroy them, they will be so seriously handicapped that they may
eventually collapse. Members of such unions would naturally desire an organi-
zation which can effectively protect them. There may thus be a great incentive
for them either to purge their union of its communist-linked leaders in order
to secure a determination that it is no longer "Communist-infiltrated," or to
form an entirely new union. The latter alternative is facilitated by section 10
of the CCA, which enables twenty per cent of the members of a "Communist-
infiltrated" organization to petition the NLRB for elections to revoke their
union's authority as bargaining agent and to select a new representative for
collective bargaining purposes. 280 This method for regaining NLRA rights
277. 61 STAT. 140 (1947),29U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
278. H.R. REP. No. 2651, pt. 1, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954) ; S. REP. No. 1709, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
279. See I TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 163 (1940):
Note, 63 YALE L.J. 1173, 1,173-75 (1954). Under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT.
156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952), unions and employers may sue in the federal courts to
enforce collective bargaining agreements regardless of diversity or jurisdictional amount.
Note, 63 YALE L.J. 1173, 1175 (1954). Although the Supreme Court has recently stated
that § 301 does not enable unions to sue to enforce the individual rights of employees to
wages, the court did not declare the section unconstitutional; presumably unions still
derive some benefit from it. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 23 U.S.L. WEEK 4141 (U.S. March 28, 1955). However, since
the CCA denies "Communist-infiltrated" unions the benefits of § 301, see text
at note 276 supra, the union will have to show diversity and jurisdictional amount
in order to enforce the contract in the federal courts. This may be difficult, since
diversity requires all members of the union to be citizens of a state other than
the employer; the problem may, however, be partially avoided by the use of a class
suit. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1412-13 (2d ed. 1948). If the union cannot sue to enforce
the collective bargaining agreement in the federal courts, it may have difficulty bringing
suit in the state courts, since some states do not consider unions legal entities capable of
suing and being sued. Note, 63 YALE L.J. 1173, 1174 n.7 (1954).
280. Section 13A(i) of the ISA (added by § 10 of the CCA) provides:
"(i) When an order of the Board determining that any such labor organization is a
Communist-infiltrated organization has become final, and such labor organization thereto-
fore has been certified under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, as a repre-
sentative of employees in any bargaining unit-
"(1) a question of representation affecting commerce, within the meaning of section
9(c) of such Act, shall be deemed to exist with respect to such bargaining unit; and
"(2) the National Labor Relations Board, upon petition of not less than 20 per
centum of the employees in such bargaining unit or any person or persons acting in
their behalf, shall under section 9 of such Act (notwithstanding any limitation of time
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seems to be much more practicable than the alternative method whereby, after
ousting its objectionable leaders, a union may petition the S.ACB to adjudge
that it is no longer "Communist-infiltrated." 28 ' The latter remedy can only
be used after a lapse of six months following a final order of the Board classi-
fying the union as "Communist-infiltrated. 2- 2 In addition, the formation of
a new union would avoid for the organization the taint of once having been
declared "Communist-infiltrated."
The consequences that can result from labelling a union "Comnunist-infil-
trated" or from merely initiating proceedings against it under the CCA -,s
require a more adequate and precise definition of "Communist-infiltrated"
organization in order to avoid the possibility of serious injury to innocent
unions. The proviso in section 7(a) of the Act does little to mitigate this
danger.
Proceedings Before the Board
After defining "Communist-infiltrated" organizations, the CCA sets forth
in section 10 the procedure to be followed in determining which organizations
fall within this classification. As under the ISAe24 the Attorney General is
given extensive discretion in deciding whether to initiate proceedings against a
group; whenever he has "reason to believe any organization is a Communist-
infiltrated organization... ," he may file a petition with the SACB to have
it so adjudged.285 Two or more affiliated organizations may be joined by him
in the same proceedinF. -s He may obtain an early hearing by certifying that
the proceeding is of "exceptional public importance."2-s Notice of the grounds
of the petition and of the time and place for the hearing must be given the
organization concerned. 8s Also, the procedure established by the ISA for pro-
ceedings before the Board is to be applied in hearings conducted under the
CCA for determining whether a group is a "Communist-infiltrated" organiza-
contained therein) direct elections in such bargaining unit or any subdivision thereof
(A) for the selection of a representative thereof for collective bargaining purposes,
and (B) to determine whether the employees thereof desire to rescind any authority
previously granted to such labor organization to enter into any agreement with their
employer pursuant to section 8(a) (3) (ii) of such Act."
This provision reduces the percentage of the employees which must petition the NLRB
for an election from the 30% ordinarily required by the Taft-Hartley Act. 61 STAT. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1952). In addition, it exempts cases coming under it from
the time limitations in § 159(e) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act which provides that a new
election may not be held if there has been a valid election within the preceding 12-month
period.
281. See note 292 infra and accompanying text.
282. See notes 293-94 infra and accompanying text.
283. See remarks of Sen. Morse, 100 Cong. Rec. 13461 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1954).
284. 64 STAT. 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792(a) (1952).
285. ISA § 13A(a) (added by § 10 of the CCA).
286. Ibid.
287. Ibid.
288. ISA §§ 13A (a), (c) (added by § 10 of the CCA).
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tion.28 9 After the hearings have been held before the SACB, the Board is
authorized to make a report setting forth its findings of fact and to enter an
order either granting or denying the determination sought by the petition.,-' 0
Provision is made for appeal to the courts from this order, and the courts
may set the order aside if it is not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.
291
The statute states that an organization determined by the Board to be
"Communist-infiltrated" may petition the Board "within six months after such
determination" for a decision that it no longer falls within this classification.-" ',
From this laguage it would appear that an organization can file such a petition
only within a six month period after it is finally categorized as a "Communist-
infiltrated" organization; if it fails to clean house before this period is up, it
can never seek a new determination. However, the legislative history of this
provision clearly indicates that the petition may be filed any time aftcr six
months have elapsed from the time the order of the Board becomes final.202
The wording of the statute is the result of poor draftsmanship.20 4 The courts
therefore should interpret the provision to carry out Congress' evident intent
and allow petitions for a new determination any time after the six month
period.295.
CONCLUSION
The haste that marked the formation and passage of much of the Communist
Control Act of 1954 is reflected in the ambiguity and incongruity of many of
289. See note 258 supra.
290. ISA § 13A (f) (added by CCA § 10).
291. See note 258 supra.
292. ISA § 13A (b) (added by § 10 of the CCA).
293. The provision at first required a one year wait before a petition to determine that
the organization was no longer "Communist-infiltrated" could be filed; and only one
petition a year could be filed. 100 Cong. Rec. 13569 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1954). It should
be noted that this first provision did not set a one year limit within which a petition must
be filed, if it was to be filed at all. The provision was attacked as unfair to unions who
cleaned house before the one year period was up. Id. at 13463-64 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1954).
It was also deemed unfair to limit petitions to one a year. Ibid. Therefore, § 13A(b) was
changed to allow a petition to be filed by the proscribed organization "upon removing from
the organization those persons determined by this section to be Communists." Fault was
also found with this wording since there was no provision in the statute for determining
individual persons to be Conununists, and therefore the new provision could never be satis-
fied. Id. at 13945 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954) (remarks by Sen. McCarran), and 13987
(remarks by Sen. Butler). Therefore the wording was again changed to its final and
present form. Sen. Butler who introduced the amendment to change the language to its
present form said: "The amendment eliminates the impossible requirement and substitutes
instead a requirement that the organization must wait six months after such determination
before filing a petition for redetermination of its status." Id. at 13987 (emphasis added).
294. Perhaps the reason this seemingly obvious error went unnoticed is that during
the major part of the debate on the new language there was only one copy of Sen. Butler's
amendment available for the whole Senate. See remarks by Sen. Kefauver, 100 Cong. Rec.
13987-89 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1954), and Sen. Lehman, id. at 13990.
295. See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 4924-26 (3d ed., Horack 19,13).
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its provisions. There is serious doubt as to whether this type of legislation
is either an effective or a desirable method of combating internal communism.
Even assuming that it is, however, the obscure language and the grave consti-
tutional defects in the CCA will probably severely limit its utility. Further
consideration should be given to the Act by Congress in order to clarify some
of its provisions, remove its constitutional pitfalls, and eliminate the possibili-
ties of inequity and oppression inherent in parts of the Act. Without further
action by Congress, the task of the courts in construing the Act vill indeed
be prodigious.
